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ABSTRACT 
Directionally Sensitive Neutron Detector for Homeland Security Applications. 
(December 2011) 
Grant Reid Spence, B.S., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. William S. Charlton 
 
With an increase in the capabilities and sophistication of terrorist networks 
worldwide comes a corresponding increase in the probability of a radiological or nuclear 
device being detonated within the borders of the United States. One method to decrease 
the risk associated with this threat is to interdict the material during transport into the 
US. Current RPMS have limitations in their ability to detect shielded nuclear materials. 
It was proposed that directionally sensitive neutron detectors might be able to overcome 
many of these limitations.   
This thesis presents a method to create a directionally sensitive neutron detector 
using a unique characteristic of 
10
B. This characteristic is the Doppler broadening of the 
de-excitation gamma-ray from the 
10B(n,α) reaction. Using conservation principles and 
the method of cone superposition, the mathematics for determining the incoming neutron 
direction vector from counts in a boron loaded cloud chamber and boron loaded 
semiconductor were derived.  
An external routine for MCNPX was developed to calculate the Doppler broaden 
de-excitation gamma-rays. The calculated spectrum of Doppler broadened de-excitation 
gamma-rays was then compared to measured and analytical spectrums and matched with 
a high degree of accuracy.  
MCNPX simulations were performed for both a prototype 
10
B loaded cloud 
chamber and prototype 
10
B loaded semiconductor detector. These simulations assessed 
the detectors’ abilities to determine incoming neutron direction vectors using simulated 
  
iv 
particle reactant data. A sensitivity analysis was also performed by modifying the energy 
and direction vector of the simulated output data for 
7
Li
*
 particles. Deviation coefficients 
showed a respective angular uncertainty of 1.86° and 6.07° for the boron loaded cloud 
chamber and a boron loaded semiconductor detectors. These capabilities were used to 
propose a possible RPM design that could be implemented.  
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NOMENCLATURE  
 
BF3  Boron Tri-fluoride 
B4C  Boron Carbide 
CCD  Compton Camera Detector 
DHS  Department of Homeland Security 
DNDO  Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 
DOD  U.S. Department of Defense 
DOE  U.S. Department of Energy 
DOS  U.S. Department of State 
DPRK  Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea 
DSTO  Database on Nuclear Smuggling, Theft, and Orphan Radiation Sources 
ECC   Emulsion Cloud Chamber 
HEU  Highly Enriched Uranium 
HPGe  High Purity Germanium 
IAEA  International Atomic Energy Agency 
ICBM  Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 
ITDB  Illicit Trafficking Database 
KAERI Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute 
MC   Monte Carlo Mathematical Model 
MCNPX  Monte Carlo N- Particle Extended 
NaI  Sodium Iodide 
PMT   Photomultiplier Tube 
PTRAC Particle Tracing Function of MCNPX 
PVT  Polyvynal Taluene 
RPMs             Radiation Portal Monitor 
SNM  Special Nuclear Material 
US  United States 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
I.A. Motivation 
I.A.1. Increased Threat for Nuclear Attack 
The terrorist attacks on the United States in September of 2001 heightened 
concerns with regard to critical infrastructure security and the methods necessary for 
guaranteeing the safety of the general public.
1
 Many of the events preceding the attacks 
on the World Trade Center in 2001 were unavoidable without the necessary framework 
to prevent them. Immediately following these attacks, the US undertook the task of 
improving its national security framework. The first step in improving the US 
framework came through gathering intelligence, both foreign and domestic, about likely 
future attacks. Among the various options for attack, the use of a nuclear device was 
deemed a probable threat.
1
  
In order to maximize the effectiveness of the US’s nuclear security framework, it 
is important to identify the parties which have the motive and capability to smuggle 
nuclear material across US borders.  The two groups with the greatest probability of 
smuggling nuclear material into the US are state actors and terrorist/criminal 
organizations. If a state actor were to launch a conventional nuclear strike against the 
US, the probability that state actor would survive a US response would be very small. 
Therefore, it would be in a state actor’s best interest to deliver the proposed nuclear 
device via covert methods such as vehicular smuggling. Unlike state actors, most 
terrorist organizations do not have the inherent capabilities to orchestrate a nuclear 
attack due to their lack of access to nuclear material, however, the nuclear threat these 
organizations pose is still viable.  If a terrorist organization were to cooperate with a 
transnational crime syndicate, one with access to black market nuclear material, the 
likelihood of a terrorist attack increases.  
This thesis follows the style of Nuclear Technology. 
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Nuclear material arrives on the black market through a complex network of 
sophisticated insider conspiracies at nuclear facilities.
2
 Through this complex network, 
the IAEA’s ITDB contains 540 confirmed incidents involving illicit trafficking of 
nuclear and radioactive materials since January 1, 1993.
3
 This number only includes 
government-confirmed information. Bridging government-confirmed cases with open-
source information, the DSTO contains a total of 1,440 cases of illicit nuclear smuggling 
during the period of 1991-2005.
4
 Although the number of reported cases
3
 of smuggled 
SNM since the mid 1990’s is only 14, it is important to note that any weapon containing 
nuclear material will have devastating consequences. Furthermore, resourceful and 
powerful organized crime groups in Russia, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Eastern and 
Southern Europe have established smoothly running mechanisms for smuggling drugs 
and weapons that could be easily adapted to nuclear material trafficking.
5
 Couple this 
with recent claims that interactions between international terrorists and organized 
criminal groups are increasing
6
, and the likelihood of an adversary attempting to 
smuggle nuclear material across US borders is seemingly inevitable.   
I.A.2. Nuclear Security and the History of RPMs 
Nuclear security can be defined as “the prevention of, detection of, and response 
to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving 
nuclear and radiological material and their associated facilities.
7” Nearly six decades ago 
when the United States was becoming aware of a probable nuclear proliferation threat it 
began enacting measures to increase nuclear security worldwide. One such example of 
US determination to increase nuclear security was in 1994 when Congress appropriated 
about $800 million for nuclear security efforts, including about $500 million to DOE, 
DOD, and DOS for international efforts.
1
 As a result, RPMs were initially placed at ports 
of entry, air ports, railways, and vehicle border crossing locations overseas with the 
purpose of interdicting smuggled nuclear material. These RPMs consisted of several 
3
He 
tubes surrounded in polyethylene for neutron detection, and plastic scintillators for 
gamma-ray detection. Eventually these RPM detectors were installed at US border 
locations to impede covert nuclear material from entering the US. The technology used 
 3 
 
 
 
 
to create these RPM detectors was developed and benchmarked in the 1970’s, thus the 
strengths and more importantly the limitations of these systems have been well 
documented.  An intelligent adversary armed with the knowledge of these detector 
limitations consequently decreases the effectiveness of installed RPMs.  Although the 
idea of having a successful network of effective RPMs is desirable, the current state of 
detector technology places this goal slightly out of reach. What the existing RPMs do 
provide, however, is a secure and robust network of detectors that provide the US 
government with a higher degree of risk management. 
I.A.3. RPMs and Risk Management 
“Risk is a function of the likelihood of an event and the consequence of that 
event.
8” When looking at the possibility of preventing a nuclear incident in the US, there 
are various factors one must take into account. Among these factors, two stand out as the 
most important. The first is the party to which the nuclear incident can be held 
accountable.  Before 9/11, the US government’s perceived primary nuclear threat came 
from another state who would act through “conventional” means. Where the term 
“conventional” being defined as an open, broadcast, attack on the US by another state, or 
group of states, taking responsibility. For this reason the probability for a nuclear 
incident in terms of risk analysis was “aleatory (stochastic)8”. After 9/11 and with the 
growing number of terrorist cells and regimes worldwide the threat of a nuclear incident 
has become multipolar. This multipolarity leads to “uncertainty in estimating the risk of 
a terrorist act” because it is “epistemic (state of knowledge) instead of aleatory 
(stochastic); for example, the adversary knows what acts will be attempted, but we as 
defender have incomplete knowledge to know those acts with certainty.
8
  
The second factor to take into consideration is the means by which the nuclear 
device will arrive in the US. If a state decides to commit a nuclear attack on the US there 
is a very high probability that the device will be smuggled into the country to avoid US 
repercussions. Similarly, a terrorist organization would do everything in its power to 
covertly insert a nuclear device into the borders of the US and detonate it. Since World 
War II the US government has been developing methods of deterrence for an outright 
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conventional nuclear attack from a state, while conversely, the concept of preventing a 
covert nuclear incident is less developed. Some of the methods a state, or non-state, actor 
would use to smuggle a nuclear device into a country include: shipping it through a 
major port via cargo container, smuggling the device through an airport via a connecting 
flight from another country, smuggling the device in by railway from a connecting 
country, smuggling the device by personal watercraft or private airplane, smuggling the 
device through illegal border crossing, or smuggling the device in a vehicle across a 
border checkpoint. There are of course other means to which an adversary may covertly 
transport a nuclear device into the US; however, these are the primary areas of concern. 
At each of these locations: ports, railways, airports, and vehicle checkpoints, an RPM 
can be placed. It should be noted of course that at each location mentioned above the 
RPMs placed there are not identical to one another, but are instead very similar in their 
nuclear detection capabilities.  
The concepts of risk, and risk management are instrumental to the allocation of 
protective resources by government agencies. As previously stated, risk can be defined 
as a function of the likelihood of an event and the consequence of that event occurring. 
Furthermore, the rate at which the risk of an event increases is proportional to the 
consequence of the event. When comparing relative risks for different types of attacks 
on the US, a nuclear attack has the greatest risk because the consequence of any nuclear 
attack is the most devastating. Since the consequence of a nuclear event is consistently 
devastating regardless of the scenario, the only way to decrease the risk of a nuclear 
event is to decrease the likelihood that event occurs. Along with physically protecting 
our borders from illicit nuclear material, the use of RPMs decreases the likelihood of a 
nuclear attack by psychologically decreasing the adversaries projected probability of 
success. If the adversary believes it is not possible to smuggle SNM over the border 
without getting caught, the probability that they will attempt to smuggle SNM is 
reduced, thus reducing the risk of an attack. Radiation detectors are placed at entrance 
points into the US to reduce the risk of nuclear threat with robust, proven and reliable 
detector technology. These characteristics encompass the RPMs in service today. If a 
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technological improvement were made on existing RPM detectors, the risk of a nuclear 
attack would decrease further.  
I.B. Objectives 
It is the goal of this research to develop a proof-of-concept for two prototype 
directionally sensitive RPMs. With the addition of directionality to the US’s RPM 
detector network, the effectiveness of this network’s ability to detect several difficult 
smuggling scenarios will drastically increase. The main steps in this research to create a 
new directionally sensitive RPM are outlined in the following subsections. 
I.B.1. Benchmark Modeling 
The effectiveness of existing RPMs was evaluated. An extensive model of a 
standard vehicle checkpoint RPM was modeled in MCNPX. Included in this model was 
a quantitative determination of an RPMs ability to detect SNM in a difficult HEU 
smuggling scenario. 
I.B.2. Verifying the Phenomena of Doppler Broadening  
A thorough analysis of the directional capabilities of 
10
B was analyzed including 
how the phenomenon of a Doppler broadened de-excitation gamma-ray can provide 
directional information. Experimental measurements were given showing the existence 
of this Doppler broadened de-excitation gamma-ray. An analytical study was performed 
to determine the limits of this phenomenon. These analytical results were compared to 
the experimental results.  
I.B.3. Simulations in MCNPX 
Potential boron loaded detectors were simulated in MCNPX. Two boron based 
detectors were analyzed in these simulations. The first detector simulated was a BF3 
cloud chamber. In this simulation, PTRAC was used to print a list of information from 
the 
10B(n,α) reaction occurring in the BF3 cloud chamber. An algorithm was created that 
modified MCNPXs PTRAC output file to correctly Doppler broaden de-excitation 
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gamma-rays from the BF3 cloud chamber simulation. These Doppler broadened gamma-
rays were then compared with experimental results to determine the validity of the 
created algorithm.  
The second detector modeled in MCNPX was a B4C semiconductor detector.  
Various enrichment and detector geometry based simulations were performed in 
MCNPX to determine an ideal detector configuration. A vehicle-based simulation was 
performed similar to the RPM benchmark simulations. The de-excitation gamma-rays 
from this simulation were modified using the created Doppler broadening algorithm.  
I.B.4. Inverse and Sensitivity Analysis 
Using the results from the previous simulations, an inverse analysis was 
performed to determine the direction vector of the incoming neutron by combining 
conservation equations and mathematic principles with a modified Doppler broadened 
de-excitation gamma-ray. The Doppler broadened de-excitation gamma-ray was 
calculated using the Doppler broadening algorithm on detector simulation results in 
MCNPX. A sensitivity analysis was performed on the resultant neutron direction vector 
to determine the sensitivity to directional accuracy with small perturbations in the 
detector output.  
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CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND 
II.A. An Analysis of Existing Radiation Portal Monitors 
In this chapter we provide detail about deployed RPMs, as well as the detection 
capabilities of these RPMs.  
II.A.1. Description of Current RPMs 
An RPM is defined as an emplaced stationary detector where objects pass by the 
monitor and are screened for the presence of radioactive materials.
9
 The ambiguity in the 
description of an RPM is due to its ability to be modified for various detection scenarios. 
Among these scenarios are cargo scanning, pedestrian scanning, vehicle scanning, and 
the scanning of railway cars. In each case the detection equipment may be different, 
however, the goal is the same: to detect radioactive particles emitted from radioactive 
sources. The primary objective for existing vehicle RPMs is to provide the initial 
screening of a vehicle or vehicles near its proximity therefore, the RPMs at border 
crossing locations are typically placed between lanes of traffic. Since the primary goal of 
these detectors is to scan large areas, the cross-sectional area of the RPM must be large 
in order to have as great a detection efficiency as possible. Examples of commercially 
available units are listed and shown in Table1 and Fig. 1 respectively.
10 
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Table 1. 
 
Commercially Available RPMs.
10
 
CPM-VGN Canberra PVT 3He
Guardian CRMS NucSafe PVT 3He
Model 4500  VRM Ludlum PVT 3He
AT-980 RPM SAIC/Exploranium PVT 3He
PM 5000 Polimaster PVT 3He
VM-250AGN TSA PVT 3He
RCD/2 RadComm PVT 3He
SGS-1500-GN Thermo Scientific PVT 3He
Model Manufacturer
Gamma 
Detector 
Type
Neutron 
Detector 
Type
 
 
Since the main function of RPMs is large-area, low-cost detection, there are a 
number of commercially available detector types that meet these requirements. The 
leading means used for photon detection is through the use of plastic scintillators which 
are almost exclusively PVT based because of its low cost and ease to manufacture. Other 
photon detector types could be used, such as HPGe semicondcutors, however they lack 
the ability to be mass deployed due to their cost of manufacturing.  The typical choice 
for photon detection, NaI crystals, is not suitable for border monitoring applications 
because the time and budget needed to ensure the crystals grow the necessary size would 
become cost prohibitive.  
The most commonly used method for detecting neutrons in RPMs is an array of 
3
He embedded in some neutron moderator, particularly polyethylene. Although 
3
He 
seems like an ideal candidate for neutron detection due its thermal neutron absorption 
cross section is 5330 barns
11
, the White House decided in September 2009 that no new 
3
He will be given to the production of RPMs due to an ongoing 
3
He shortage.
12
  For 
these reasons the DNDO is in search of a new type of neutron detector that is both 
efficient and cost effective.  
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Fig. 1. Vehicle RPMs at a border crossing checkpoint.
10
  
 
II.A.2. Capabilities of Existing RPMs 
As mentioned in the previous section, the primary goal of the DNDO is to place 
several low cost, high efficiency RPMs at vehicle crossing checkpoints. For these 
reasons, the DNDO has decided to proceed with reliable, well explored, detector 
technology that was created nearly four decades ago. This type of strategy has its 
benefits and drawbacks. The primary benefit is cost effectiveness. If the cost per unit is 
low enough the potential quantity of RPMs increases, thus increasing the overall 
detection probability for smuggled SIM. Another benefit to using well understood, pre-
existing technology is that the limitations of the detector materials are known. Since the 
detection thresholds for PVTs and 
3
He tubes are well documented from past 
experiments, border officials can create a complex network of RPMs which generate a 
high detection probability for most smuggling scenarios.  
There are also several troubling elements with using low cost RPMs based off of 
time tested and verified technology. If an intelligent adversary were to have a working 
knowledge of the capabilities of the RPMs in service, it could be possible for them to 
fool the detector by shielding their radioactive material, thus the probability of success 
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for a smuggling scenario would increase.  One particular scenario that exemplifies this is 
the smuggling of shielded HEU into the US. In the summer of 2002 an ABC news team 
performed an intricate series of tests on currently deployed RPMs and found troubling 
results: 
In the summer of 2002 an ABC News unit successfully slipped a lead-lined 
steel pipe containing a 6.8-kilogram (15-pound) cylinder of depleted 
uranium (DU) past U.S. Customs and Border Protection by placing it inside 
a standard cargo container. This material is unsuitable for a weapon, but its 
chemical properties are nearly identical to those of HEU. Our organization, 
the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), prepared the shielded 
cylinder. The ABC News crew placed the pipe in an ordinary suitcase and 
carried it on passenger trains from Vienna to Istanbul--a route chosen to 
simulate a terrorist journey. The news crew saw no radiation detection 
equipment along the way. 
On reaching Istanbul, the journalists placed the suitcase inside an ornamental 
chest, packed alongside crates of huge vases in a large metal shipping 
container that left Istanbul by ship on July 10. When the container arrived at 
Staten Island in New York, Customs officials, part of Homeland Security, 
targeted it as high risk, in part because of its origin, and flagged it for more 
thorough screening. The machine and its operators failed to sense the 
uranium.
13 
Another element to consider when looking at the capabilities of the RPM is its 
large detection efficiency. This is true only because the solid angle (the amount of the 
detectors surface an incoming particle sees) is so large. Experiments for neutron and 
gamma detection efficiencies have been performed comparing different detection 
materials to those used in RPMs. In regards to neutron detection, “the results show that 
neutron detection efficiency is larger for the [boron loaded] liquid scintillator than for 
the He-3 counter (note that the He-3 counter has 6 times larger volume and covers more 
than 5 times larger solid angle).
14” These results show that if a different type of neutron 
detector were used in an RPM, the neutron detection efficiency could be drastically 
improved.  Conversely, the PVTs used for gamma-ray detection in the RPMs had a 
greater total absolute efficiency(the ability of a detector to detect incoming gamma-rays) 
than other similar gamma-ray detectors, but had a marginally lower absolute peak 
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efficiency ( the resolution which the gamma-rays energy is recorded) then other similar 
gamma-ray detectors.
15 
II.B. Previous Work in the Field of Directionally Sensitive Detectors 
Before continuing research into the field of directionally sensitive radiation 
detectors, it is important to recognize research previously performed in the area.  In the 
following subsections it will be shown that detectors have been developed which are 
capable of providing incoming particle direction. Some of the mechanisms with which 
these detectors derive this directionality include particle recoil, scintillation, and 
absorption or decay reactions. In this section a brief introduction and history into some 
of these detector configurations will be given.  
II.B.1. Cloud Chambers 
One of the first directional detectors developed was a variation of Wilson’s 
Cloud Chamber called an Emulsion Cloud Chamber. “The ECC technique was first 
introduced in 1951 to study high-energy interactions in cosmic rays.
16” An ECC is 
constructed by carefully aligning alternate layers of a strong nuclear absorber in a 
sensitive nuclear emulsion.
17
  The procedure to locate “high energy events then consists 
of a systematic survey for electronic showers in one of the emulsions deep in the stack; 
if the plates are carefully aligned, it is then possible to trace the shower in succeeding 
and preceding emulsions
17”, therein making it “possible to see the trails left by high 
energy particles – [an ECC] provides an environment where the wake of [high energy 
particles] can be observed.
18” Using the “wake”, or momentum, of these radioactive 
particles, the direction of the incoming particle can be calculated.  
Initially the momentum of charged particle calculations consisted of tedious 
manual measurements, whereas today it can be fully automated. The two automated 
methods to calculate the charged particles momentum are the “coordinate” (sometimes 
called the “sagitta”) method and the “angular” method. Each method measures the 
deviations of the charged particles trajectory from a straight line on the basis of position 
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or angle.
19
 A depiction of the “coordinate” method and the “angular” method is 
illustrated
16
 in Fig. 2. 
 
Fig. 2. A schematic overview of measuring multiple Coulomb scattering. The coordinate 
method requires precise alignment between emulsion plates, whereas angular method 
uses the angle difference between base tracks. 
 
A similar cloud chamber detector configuration also currently exists that 
combines the neutron absorbing properties of 
3
He, 
4
He and 
1
H, with the scintillation 
properties of CF4 to provide directionality information about the incoming particle.
20
 
The detector consists of a chamber that contains CF4 gas at low pressure for photon 
scintillation, one bar or 
4
He is added to provide a recoil target for fast neutrons, and a 
few Torr of 
3
He are added to detect thermal neutrons via the 
3
He(n,p) reaction. Inside the 
canister also lies a cathode mesh and field cage which creates an electric field in an 
electron drift region. A charged particle created from one of the previously mentioned 
helium reactions then passes through the chamber leaving a trail of ionization electrons 
 13 
 
 
 
 
in its wake. These electrons then drift to the amplification plane where an electron 
avalanche occurs; this is accompanied by the emission of scintillation light from CF4. 
The scintillation light is then imaged by the CCD camera at the top of the canister. This 
detector configuration also has the added benefit of reducing the signal received from 
background radiation by adding track morphology cuts. A cross-sectional schematic of 
this detector configuration is illustrated
20
 in Fig. 3, and alpha particle tracks are shown
20
 
in Fig. 4. 
 
Fig. 3. Cross-sectional schematic of a gas combination cloud chamber neutron detector. 
 
II.B.2. Compton Cameras 
Another well developed directional detector system is a Compton camera. 
Although Compton cameras detect strictly photons, it is important to mention this 
detector configuration due to the magnitude of research performed in the area. 
Furthermore some of the mathematics behind Compton camera directionality applies 
directly to this research. A Compton scatter occurs when a photon scatters with a free 
electron orbiting a nuclei. The electron is ejected from its orbit taking away some of the 
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incident photons momentum, wherein the incident photon is then scattered to a different 
angle with a lower energy.
21
  
 
 
Fig. 4. Two alpha tracks from 
241
Am source captured in the gas combination cloud 
chamber. 
A Compton camera consists of a “combination of two separated gamma-ray 
detectors operated in coincidence… A collimated beam of gamma-rays is allowed to 
strike the first detector in which the desired mode of interaction is now Compton 
scattering. Some fraction of the scattered gamma-rays will travel to the second detector 
where they may also interact to give a second pulse. Because the separation distance is 
normally no greater than a few tens of centimeters, the pulses are essentially in time 
coincidence.
22
 In order to recreate the incident photon’s direction vector: 
 It is the 2-site events that are of primary interest. In particular, if one 
could experimentally determine the position and energy at both interaction 
sites, one could then use the energy-angle relationship of Compton scattering 
to determine the Compton scattering angle. This angle then defines a cone of 
possible incident directions for the gamma-ray… Over many events, these 
cones, if projected onto an image plane or image sphere, will overlap at the 
source position, thus giving [the direction vector for the incoming photon].
23
  
 
A visual representation of the angle reconstruction method
24
 can be seen below in Fig. 5.  
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Fig. 5. A visual representation of the Compton Camera angle reconstruction method. E0 
is the source location, x1 and x2 are locations of the parallel gamma detectors. 
II.B.3. Liquid Scintillator Detectors 
Research has also been performed into using liquid scintillator detectors as 
directional detectors. Liquid scintillator detectors can provide particle directionality by 
both scintillation and recoil reactions. Along with directionality, a major benefit to using 
liquid scintillator detectors is their ability to detect both photons and neutrons. Before 
directional measurements can be made however, it is first necessary to separate photon 
counts from neutron counts.  
Particle separation is done by using pulse shape discrimination. For the vast 
majority of organic scintillators, “the prompt fluorescence represents most of the 
observed scintillation light. A longer-lived component is also observed in many cases, 
however, corresponding to delayed fluorescence. [These can be dubbed] the fast and 
slow components of scintillation. Compared with the prompt decay time of a few 
nanoseconds, the slow component will typically have a characteristic decay time of 
several hundred nanoseconds. Because the majority of the light yield occurs in the 
prompt component, the long-lived tail would not be of great consequence except for one 
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very useful property: The fraction of light that appears in the slow component often 
depends on the nature of the exciting particle. One can therefore make use of this 
dependence to differentiate between particles of different kinds that deposit the same 
energy in the detector. This process is often called pulse shape discrimination and is 
widely applied to eliminate gamma-ray-induced events when organic scintillators are 
used as neutron detectors.
22” Once separated by pulse shape discrimination, the 
scintillation tracks created by photons can be captured in CCD cameras, similar to the 
methods described in the cloud chamber section, to give particle directionality. 
Liquid scintillators also give neutron directionality information in a similar 
manner to Compton cameras, this method is called the neutron double-scatter 
technique.
25
 Similar to a Compton camera detector, “an incident neutron deposits energy 
in the first detector by scattering elastically from a proton in the detection material. The 
proton recoils with kinetic energy which is converted into detectable light that is read by 
PMTs and converted into an electrical pulse. The energy of the scattered neutron is 
determined by the time of flight between the first scatter and a subsequent scatter in a 
second detector. The original energy of the incident neutron and the scattering angle can 
be determined by employing energy and momentum conservation laws. The scattering 
angle defines a cone on the surface of which the neutron source must lie. Each new 
double-scatter event defines a new cone, the superposition of which determines the 
location of the neutron source.
26” A better representation26 of the phenomenon behind 
neutron double-scatter imaging can be seen in Fig. 6. 
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Fig. 6. Schematic of a neutron double-scatter imager. 
 
II.B.4. Semiconductor Detectors 
Recent research into semiconductor detector systems have allowed for extensive 
improvements in spatial resolution, high sensitivity, wide dynamic range and low 
noise.
27
 Couple this with the already well known high detection efficiencies and 
improved energy resolution inherent in semiconductor detectors, and the concept of a 
position sensitive semiconductor detector is appealing. The one important caveat 
however is that since semiconductor detectors operate based off of charged particle 
ionizations, the probability for detecting neutrally charged neutrons is very low.
27
 
Therefore the surface of the pixilated semiconductor is coated with a thin layer of highly 
absorbing neutron material. The one requirement to making this semiconductor detector 
configuration a successful neutron detector is that the bi-products of the neutron reaction 
must include “heavy” charged particles, where a “heavy” particle is defined as a charged 
particle with a mass greater than an electron.
28
 These charged particles then locally 
ionize electrons within the pixel in which they were generated.  Stacking multiple coated 
semiconductor wafers on top of one another allows for directional recreation of the 
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charged particles through its interaction in each wafer’s pixel. The incoming neutron 
vector can then be calculated through conservation principles.  
The typical neutron absorbing semiconductor coating material is 
6
LiF. The 
reactant particles created from the 
6Li(n,α) reaction are 3H, and α, each carrying 2.7 MeV 
and 2.08 MeV respectively. Since the reactant products have such high energies the 
probability that they deposit most of their energy in localized depletion regions is low.
28
 
Simulations and experiments were performed to determine the coated semiconductors 
true detector efficiency using MCNPX and gave a detection efficiency of ~6%, where as 
the experimental results gave a detection efficiency of ~3%. A ~3% detection efficiency 
relates experimentally to 0.3 counts/pixel/second.
27 
Results from coated semiconductor 
experiments show that if “heavy” particle detector efficiency can be increased, coated 
semiconductor detectors would be an ideal choice for a directionally sensitive neutron 
detector.  
The existing RPM detector configurations outlined in this chapter have their 
benefits and detriments. They are robust and inexpensive, yet they are constructed with 
technology which allows for certain smuggling scenarios to go undetected. In this 
research the concept of adding directionality to RPMs to increase their detection 
capability is discussed. By combining the directional methods discussed in this chapter 
with the relatively unexplored phenomenon of Doppler broadening in the 
10B(n,α) 
reaction, a proof-of-concept  for two prototype directionally sensitive RPM detectors 
was created. 
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CHAPTER III 
THEORY 
In this chapter the theory used to create a directionally sensitive neutron detectors 
using 
10
B is discussed. The unique characteristics of the 
10B(n,α) reactions is described 
in detail, and the Doppler broadening mathematics are analyzed. The basic principle of 
the Monte Carlo method and its application to MCNPX is given, and detail is also 
provided about how MCNPX can be used to simulate directionally sensitive neutron 
detectors.  
III.A. 
10B(n,α) Reaction 
The 2.31 MeV Q value
22
 of the 
10B(n,α) reaction, and high energy reactant 
products make it a desirable material for detectors which operate based on ionization 
principles. When a neutron interacts with a 
10
B atom it produces two secondary particles: 
a α and 7Li particle. The unique feature of this reaction is that the 7Li particle has a 94% 
probability of being created in an excited state.
22 
If the reaction were to occur in the 
ground state, due to thermal neutron absorption, the energies of the reactant products are 
1.02 MeV and 1.78 MeV for 
7
Li and α respectively. If the 10B(n,α)  reaction produces an 
excited state 
7
Li
*
(where 
*
 represents an excited state), the  
7
Li
*
 and 
4
He products from 
thermal neutron absorption have energies of 840 keV (after de-excitation) and 1.47 MeV 
respectively.   An illustrated
29
 representation of the probabilities and energies for each 
reaction can be seen in Fig. 7.  In order to de-excite, the 
7
Li
*
 particle emits a 477.56 keV 
gamma-ray in flight. Since the de-excitation gamma-ray is emitted in flight, the energy 
of the de-excitation gamma-ray is modified by the kinetic energy and direction of the 
7
Li
* 
particle. If the de-excitation gamma-ray is emitted in the same direction of the 
7
Li
*
 
particle, the energy of the gamma-ray appears greater than 477.56 keV in a photon 
detector. If the gamma-ray is emitted opposite the direction the 
7
Li
*
 particle is traveling, 
the energy appears less than 477.56 keV. This is known as geometric Doppler 
broadening. 
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Fig. 7. The 
10B(n,α) thermal neutron reaction showing the de-excitation 477.56 
keV gamma-ray. 
 
Another reason 
10
B is desirable for a neutron detector is because of its large 3840 
barn thermal neutron absorption cross-section.
30
 This cross-section is inversely related to 
the incoming neutrons velocity.
31
 This means that the neutron absorption cross-section in 
10
B decreases with an increasing neutron energy as seen in Fig. 8.
32 
 
Fig. 8. Total neutron cross section for 
10
B. 
 
As part of the necessary parameters for the mathematics behind direction 
sensitive detectors, one of two quantities are needed before a directional analysis can be 
performed: the reactant product’s energies or the reactant product’s emission angles. In 
this research a forward model is defined as a scenario where the neutron energy, neutron 
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angle, and the reactant product’s emission angles are known, leaving the reactant 
particle’s energies to be solved. An inverse model is defined as a scenario where the 
reactant energies and angles of emission are known, leaving the incoming neutron 
energy and angle to be solved. Of course, in order to verify the accuracy of either model 
it is necessary to mathematically derive the incoming neutron energy (for verification of 
the inverse model), and the emission angles of the reactant products (for verification of 
the forward model). The tools used to derive these quantities are conservation of energy 
and momentum. If the 
7
Li is left in an excited state, conservation of energy yields: 
         
         (1) 
If the ground state reaction occurs, conservation of energy yields: 
                 (2) 
where    is the incoming neutron energy,    is the alpha particle energy,    
  is the 
excited state 
7
Li
*
 particle energy,     is the ground state 
7
Li particle energy, and   is the 
Q-value of the reaction.  
Conservation of momentum is then used to derive the angle between α and 7Li, 
or θ and φ respectively, and the incident neutron direction vector. A visual representation 
of this can be seen in Fig. 9. The conservation of momentum in the x-direction yields: 
                                    (3a) 
Conservation of momentum in the y-direction yields: 
                     (3b) 
where    is the momentum of the neutron,     is momentum of the 
7
Li particle,    is the 
momentum of the alpha particle,   is the angle between the 7Li particle and the incident 
neutron direction, and    is the angle between the α particle and the incident neutron. 
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Subtracting         from    in Equation 3(a), squaring both sides and 
rearranging yields:  
    
                
         
                (4) 
Squaring Equation 3(b) yields 
     
         
          (5) 
Subtracting Equation 4 from Equation 5 and solving for      gives:  
     
    
     
    
  
      
      (6) 
Substituting Equation 6 into Equation 3(a) and solving for       yields: 
     
  
  
 
   
     
    
  
     
        (7) 
Substituting the momentum-energy relation (      ) and Equation 2 into Equation 
7, solving for θ gives:  


n
B10
1r

3r


*7Li

Fig. 9. Visual representation for the scattering angles of reactant 
products in the 
10B(n,α)  reaction. 
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Substituting        and Equation 2 into Equation 6 and solving for φ gives: 
 
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QEEmEmEm

      (9) 
where   ,    , and    are the masses of the neutron, 
7
Li
*
 and α particles respectively, 
and   , 
*
LiE are the energies of the respective α and  
7
Li
*
 reactant particles. Equations 8 
and 9 show that if the energy of the two reactant particles are determined experimentally 
in the detector system, the angle between the two particles can be calculated analytically. 
More importantly the angle of the neutron with respect to either the α or 7Li* particle can 
be determined. These experimental and analytical results can then be used in conjunction 
with the aforementioned forward and inverse models to recreate the unknown particle 
direction vectors.  Note that Equations 8 and 9 can apply for both the case where the 
7
Li 
particle is in an excited state (Equation 1) or in the ground state (Equation 2).  
III.B. Doppler Broadening 
Using Equations 8 and 9, we can acquire the neutron direction vector if we know 
the energies of the resultant products and the direction of one of the two resultant 
particles. We can acquire information about the direction of the 
7
Li
*
 by observing the 
Doppler broadened energy of its de-excitation gamma-ray in a detector. We first 
determine if we can accurately predict the Doppler broadening effect using simulations 
compared to experiments.  
Doppler energy broadening occurs when a particle is emitted from another 
particle that is already traveling at some velocity. Specifically, photon Doppler 
broadening occurs when some photons are emitted from particles moving towards the 
detector and others from particles moving away from the detector. This, in turn, affects 
the frequencies detected by the detector due to a Doppler effect. Some of the photons 
appear to have a frequency slightly greater than its original frequency and some a 
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frequency slightly less, depending on the direction and magnitude of the velocity of the 
emitting particles.
33
 As previously mentioned, the 
10B(n,α)  reaction creates an excited 
state 
7
Li
*
 particle 94% of the time. In order for the 
7
Li
*
 particle to de-excite, it emits a 
477.56 keV photon in flight. The thermal-neutron-induced, Doppler-broadened, de-
excitation gamma-ray has been measured experimentally
34
 and can be seen in Fig. 10. 
The experimental configuration consisted of a BF3 chamber with cold neutrons incident 
from one direction on the chamber, and a HPGe set at 90° relative to the neutron beam 
for measuring the de-excitation gamma-rays.
34
  As can be seen in Fig. 10, with a cold 
neutron (essentially zero energy) the de-excitation gamma-ray broadens from 477.56 
keV to an approximate range of 469 keV to 486 keV.   
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Fig. 10. Experimentally measured distribution of Doppler broadened photons 
from a thermally induced 
10B(n,α)  reaction. 
 
The analytic solution to the Doppler broadened de-excitation gamma-ray is given 
by:  
  
     
  
  
 
    
   
 
 
 
   
   
 
     
                (10) 
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where   
    is the Doppler broadened gamma-ray frequency,   
   is the initial 477.56 keV 
de-excitation gamma-ray frequency,     is the velocity of the 
7
Li
* 
particle,   is the speed 
of light, and   is the angle between the de-excitation gamma-ray and the 7Li* particle. 
The Doppler broadened gamma-ray frequency in Equation 10 can be analytically solved 
for all  , such that      . These results were compared to the experimental results 
in Fig. 11.  
 
Fig. 11. Theoretical versus analytical Doppler broadened de-excitation photons 
from an excited 
7
Li
*
 particle. 
 
The disagreement between the analytic and measured distributions seen in Fig. 
11 can be attributed to two factors in the experimental configuration. If the BF3 gas were 
dense enough in the experimental configuration, the velocity of the 
7
Li
*
 particle could 
theoretically decrease so fast, via scattering and ionization reactions in the BF3, that its 
velocity contribution to the de-excitation gamma-ray would be significantly decreased. 
An experiment to verify this phenomenon was performed by measuring the Doppler 
broadened “hump” in three separately dense boron-containing materials, listed in 
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increasing density: BF3 gas (~0.01 g/cm
3
), a boric acid solution in water (~1.0 g/cm
3
), 
and an NdFeB magnet (7.4 g/cm
3
).
34
  The results of this experiment can be seen in Fig. 
12, it is important to note that as the density increases, the shape of the hump approaches 
the single 477.56 keV peak. 
 
Fig. 12. Doppler broadened spectrum collected for three boron-containing materials 
showing the alternation of the 
10B(n,α) peak with material density. 
 
The second factor which could affect the Doppler broadened photons in the 
experimental versus analytic results seen in Fig. 11 could be detector resolution. The 
Doppler broadened photons in the experimental configuration were detected using a 
HPGe detector with a measured resolution of 2.02 keV.  Assuming a Gaussian shape to 
the peaks in the HPGe detector, the analytical results were modified to include detector 
resolution using: 
         
 
    
 
 
      
   
 
    (11) 
where   is the energy bin of the detector,    is the mean of counts, and    is the standard 
deviation due to the FWHM. The Gaussian error in the system was assumed to be 
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consistent with the broadened energy resolution calculated using the FWHM of the 
peaks. Fig. 13 compares the experimental Doppler broadened spectra, with the 
analytically calculated spectra including detector resolution. As seen in Fig. 13 , the 
detector resolution played a significant role in the shape of the Doppler broadened 
“hump”. Furthermore, the similarities between the analytic and experimental results in 
Fig. 13 validate the accuracy of the Doppler broadening expressions given in Equation 
10. 
 
Fig. 13. Experimental results versus analytic solutions including detector 
resolution. 
III.C. MCNPX, PTRAC, and the Monte Carlo Method  
In this work, Monte Carlo (MC) simulations using MCNPX were used to model 
the interactions of neutrons with prototype directionally-sensitive neutron detectors. 
MCNPX is a code developed and maintained by Los Alamos National Laboratory that 
uses MC methods to simulate nuclear interactions. MCNPX uses the stochastic MC 
method to “obtain answers by simulating individual particles and recording some aspects 
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of their average behavior. The average behavior of the particles in the physical system is 
then inferred (using the central limit theorem) from the average behavior of the 
simulated particles.
35” Typically, an MCNPX simulation operates by following each of 
many particles from a source throughout its life to its death in some terminal category 
(absorption, escape, etc.). To determine each step of the particle’s life, probability 
distributions are randomly sampled.
35
 Fig. 14 and the ensuing paragraph, paraphrased 
from the MCNPX manual
35
, offer a greater explanation for the typical process MCNPX 
undergoes when simulating a particle history:  
 
[Fig. 14] represents the random history of a neutron incident on a 
slab of material that can undergo fission. Numbers between 0 and 1 are 
selected randomly to determine what (if any) and where interaction takes 
place, based on the rules (physics) and probabilities (transport data) 
governing the processes and materials involved. In this particular example, a 
neutron collision occurs at event 1. The neutron is scattered in the direction 
shown, which is selected randomly from the physical scattering distribution. 
A photon is also produced and is temporarily stored, or banked, for later 
analysis. At even 2, fission occurs, resulting in the termination of the 
incoming neutron and the birth of two outgoing neutrons and one photon. 
One neutron and the photon are banked for later analysis. The first fission 
neutron is captured at event 3 and terminated. The banked neutron is now 
retrieved and, by random sampling, leaks out of the slab at even 4. The 
fission-produced photon has a collision at event 5 and leaks out at event 6. 
The remaining photon generated at event 1 is now followed with a capture at 
event 7. Note that MCNPX retrieves banked particles such that the last 
particle stored in the bank is the first particle taken out.
35
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Fig. 14.  MCNP event log for tracking a neutron’s life in a fissionable material. 
 
The MC method to determine a particle’s history in a material has its advantages 
and disadvantages. One of the main advantages gained by using the MC method as 
compared to others is its computational efficiency, which can lead to increased 
simulation accuracy due to greater statistics as a result of more particle histories. More 
histories combined with an extensive knowledge of particle interaction probabilities 
makes MCNP simulations have an even higher degree of accuracy. The MC method 
however, does have a major disadvantage in the way it creates information for secondary 
reactant particles. Referencing back to Fig. 14, the neutron scatters at event 1, creating a 
photon that is “stored”. After the remaining life of the neutron is carried out, MCNP 
gives information to the photon created at event 7 by sampling from a distribution of 
characteristic probabilities. In this scenario, since the photon is the only created particle, 
the characteristics, such as energy and angle, attributed to this photon only depend on the 
single scattering reaction at event 1. If event 1 were replaced with a 
10B(n,α)  reaction, 
however, the characteristics given to the 
7
Li
*
 and α particles are incorrectly determined 
by considering only their dependence upon the characteristics of the incoming neutron. 
In order to appropriately model this reaction, the reactant products must be dependent on 
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one another as well as the incoming neutron. Thus, a complete simulation of a detector 
using 
10
B would include using MCNP to model where neutrons interact in a detector 
with a 
10B(n,α)  reaction and then calculating the energies and angles of the resultant 
products using Equations 1, 8, 9, and 10. These calculated energies and angles could 
then be used to reconstruct incoming neutron direction cosines in simulated RPM 
detector configurations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 31 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
INVERSE PROBLEM ANALYSIS 
The steps outlined in Chapter III describe the mathematics necessary to calculate 
the energies and angles of reactant products from the 
10B(n,α)  reaction in a forward 
model given an incident neutron energy and direction. In order to solve for the incoming 
neutron direction in an actual detector system however, an inverse model is required. 
Described in the following subsections are the processes and mathematics behind 
deriving the incoming neutron direction vector through inverse modeling in a boron 
loaded cloud chamber, and a boron loaded semiconductor.  
IV.A. Inverse Modeling of a Boron Loaded Cloud Chamber 
As mentioned in Sec. II.B.1., cloud chambers have the unique ability to provide 
the energies and angles of reactant particles from the 
10B(n,α)  reaction. Listed in Table 2 
are the pertinent known and unknown quantities necessary for the recreation of the 
incoming neutron direction vector interacting in a boron loaded cloud chamber.  
Table 2.  
Quantities Used to Solve Inverse Modeling in a Boron Loaded Cloud Chamber. 
ELi
(u,v,w)n
Measured 
Quantities
Known Quantities Unknown Quantities
En
Eα
Q
Eγ
de-excite
(u,v,w)γ*
(u,v,w)Li
E
*
γ
(u,v,w)α
 
(u,v,w): Direction cosine for the respective particle. 
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Using a combination of the measured and known quantities, and conservation of 
momentum in every direction, the direction cosine for the incoming neutron can be 
calculated. The quantities in Table 2 are used in conjunction with Equation 3(a) to give: 
   
                        
      
               (12) 
   
                        
      
    (13) 
   
                        
      
    (14) 
 
where   ,   ,    , are the respective direction cosines of the incoming neutron, α and 
7
Li 
particles with respect to the x-axis;   ,   ,    , are the respective direction cosines of the 
incoming neutron, α and 7Li particles with respect to the y-axis; and   ,  ,   , are the 
respective direction cosines of the incoming neutron, α and 7Li particles with respect to 
the z-axis. In experimental conditions, the BF3 cloud chamber detector provides the 
energies and angles of the 
7
Li
*
 and α reactant particles. The angle and energy of the 
Doppler broadened de-excitation gamma-ray is recorded in coincidence in the adjoining 
HPGe detector. With reactant particle energies and directions, the incoming neutron 
direction cosines can be calculated via the mathematics in Equations 12-14. 
Recreating the incoming neutron direction cosines from simulated MCNPX data 
required a slightly different method. Since MCNPX and PTRAC do not conserve 
particle information when generating 
10B(n,α) reactant particle data, Equations 12-14 
cannot be used.  In order to create the incoming neutron direction vector using the 
PTRAC data produced from MCNPX, information about the angle of emittance for one 
of the three reactant particles was manufactured. Since the incoming neutron information 
from the simulation was listed in PTRAC, Equations 12-14 could be modified to 
manufacture appropriate direction cosines for a reactant particle. In this research, the 
7
Li
*
 particle information was held constant, and the alpha particle direction cosines were 
manufactured using: 
   
                        
        
               (15) 
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    (16) 
   
                        
        
    (17) 
After calculating the direction cosine for the α particle, both reactant particles 
had energies and directions which obeyed the necessary conservation principles. 
Equations 13-15 were then used to calculate the incoming neutron direction vector. 
Although the concept of using the incoming neutron information and Equations 15-17 to 
manufacture α particle information seems redundant, the purpose of generating this data 
was to emulate experimental data of the 
10B(n,α) reaction provided from a BF3 detector. 
Using the methods provided in this subsection, an incoming neutron direction cosine can 
be reconstructed in simulated and experimental conditions. 
IV.B. Inverse Modeling of a Boron Loaded Semiconductor 
In detector configurations like a boron loaded semiconductor detector, the 
direction vectors for the α and 7Li particles cannot be measured directly. Since the 
reactant particle direction vectors are unknown, the steps outlined in Sec. III.A. to 
calculate the angle between reactant products and the incoming neutron cannot be 
performed. Listed in Table 3 are the pertinent known and unknown quantities necessary 
for the recreation of the incoming neutron direction vector interacting in a boron loaded 
semiconductor. 
Table 3.  
Quantities Used to Solve Inverse Modeling in a Boron Loaded Semiconductor. 
Measured 
Quantities
Known Quantities Unknown Quantities
En Q (u,v,w)n
Eα Eγ
de-excite (u,v,w)α
ELi (u,v,w)Li
E
*
γ
(u,v,w)γ
*
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Although the direction cosines of the reactant particles are not given and cannot 
be calculated, solving for the angle between the de-excitation gamma-ray and the 
7
Li
*
 
particle can be done. Using this angle and the superposition of cones, it is possible to 
create a set of solutions in which the incoming neutron direction vector must lie. The 
first step in this process is to calculate the angle between the de-excitation gamma-ray 
and the 
7
Li
*
 reactant particle. This is done by rearranging Equation 11 to solve the angle 
between the two particles: 
          
   
 
   
   
  
  
 
    
   
 
 
 
  
                      (18) 
where       is the angle between the de-excitation gamma-ray and the 
7
Li
*
 particle. 
With the separation angle calculated, a surface equation for a cone of solutions including 
all possible 
7
Li
*
 direction vectors can be created using the formula for a conic surface as 
seen in Equation 19:  
                                                (19) 
where      denotes the surface of the cone formed by all possible 7Li* direction vectors.  
It is important to note that every vector lying on the surface of the cone defined by 
Equation 20 is a different 
7
Li
*
 solution vector, each having their own individual neutron 
direction vector solution sets. After a solution set of all possible 
7
Li
*
 direction vectors 
has been created, Equation 10 can be used to calculate the angle between the incoming 
neutron and one of the possible 
7
Li
*
 direction vectors, or       . The newly calculated 
        now allows for the creation of another conic surface solution set which possesses 
the incoming neutron direction vector. The equation for this conic surface solution set is 
defined by Equation 20: 
                                                (20) 
                            
where         , is the direction vector of the incoming neutron. Thus, it is important to 
note that using the process described above results in a space of solution sets for 
          and          and not a single unique solution. In this work we will focus on 
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the ability to determine the        quantity and not consider in detail the superposition of 
cones problem (which is routinely solved in medical physics). 
 A visual representation of the steps taken to create the conic surfaces in 
Equations 19 - 20 are illustrated in Fig. 15 –Fig. 17. In Fig. 15 the neutron interacts with 
a 
10
B nucleus at (0,0,0) causing a 
10B(n,α)  reaction which emits a 7Li* particle in the 
negative Y, and positive Z directions. Since this simulation occurs in a boron loaded 
semiconductor detector, only the 
7
Li
*
 energy is detected in the system. Shortly after the 
initial  
10B(n,α) reaction , the 7Li* particle emits it’s de-excitation gamma-ray traveling in 
the positive X direction. Since both the angle and energy of this gamma-ray are detected 
by a secondary photon detector, the angle between the gamma-ray and the 
7
Li* can be 
calculated (       . The direction vector of the de-excitation gamma-ray is then set as the 
axis of rotation, and a cone surface is created by rotating  2π around this axis at        as 
seen in Fig. 16.  
 
Fig. 15. A schematic illustrating an example of the direction vectors for the three 
particles of interest in the 
10B(n,α)  reaction. 
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Fig. 16. A schematic illustrating the cone surface of possible 
7
Li
*
 direction 
vectors from Equation 20. 
 
From the surface of the cone displayed in Fig. 16, Equation 21 is used to generate 
a cone surface of incoming neutron direction vectors for every 
7
Li
*
 direction vector. 
Included in the neutron direction vector cone surface is the direction the neutron came 
from (0,0,-1) as seen in Fig. 17. If a neutron source were emitting neutrons in a constant 
direction, several 
10
B nuclei in the proximity of the first interaction site would also 
undergo the 
10B(n,α)  reaction. These subsequent reactions would create a similar series 
of secondary neutron surface cones similar to the cone seen in Fig. 17. An overlapping 
of multiple surface cone solutions can then be used to triangulate the original incoming 
neutron direction cosine as seen in Fig. 18. Using the method of cone superposition, if a 
prototype boron loaded RPM semiconductor detector were created, the incoming neutron 
direction cosines could be reconstructed.  
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Fig. 17. A schematic illustrating the superpostition of cones to solve for the 
incoming neutron direction vector outlined in Equation 21. 
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Fig. 18. The source of the incoming neutron direction vector can be determined by 
triangulating multiple neutron surface cones from interactions in close vicinity. 
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CHAPTER V 
PROTOTYPE DESIGNS 
V.A. Boron Loaded Cloud Chamber 
In Sec. III.D.1 the concept of creating a directionally sensitive cloud chamber 
using 
10
B was discussed. In this section, the feasibility of placing a boron loaded cloud 
chamber at vehicle monitoring stations will be analyzed. Currently the neutron detectors 
at vehicle monitoring stations consist exclusively of 
3
He tubes. The performance of these 
3
He tubes will be compared to similar tubes filled with BF3 to determine the limits of 
either gas’ detection capability, and then a prototype BF3 cloud chamber will be 
introduced. 
The thermal neutron capture cross section for 
3
He tubes is 5327 barns which 
roughly doubles the 3840 barn cross section of BF3. To further this, “since 
3
He detectors 
can be operated at higher gas pressures, they theoretically offer higher detection 
efficiency than BF3. However, 
3
He detectors are more sensitive to gamma radiation and 
result in poor discrimination between thermal neutron pulses and gamma radiation 
pulses.
36” A series of experiments were performed by Pacific Northwest National 
Laboratory comparing the 
3
He tubes in RPMs to hypothetical BF3 tubes of the same 
dimensions . The experiments were performed within the same environment (the 
material in the tubes were simply substituted), with a different number of tubes and 
different gas pressures. In the experiment a lead and polyethylene shielded 
252
Cf source 
was placed two meters from the center of, and perpendicular to, the front face of the 
RPM.  The results
37
 of these tests are seen in Fig. 19.  
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Fig. 19. Absolute detection efficiency for multiple 
3
He and BF3 tubes.
37
 
 
As seen in Fig. 19, with a shielded source both of these detector configurations 
have a relatively low absolute efficiencies. It should be noted that a minimum of three 
BF3 tubes are needed to meet the required efficiency of 0.109% at one atmosphere, and 
roughly two times the amount of BF3 is needed to match or supersede the 
3
He detection 
efficiency at a similar pressure. It is also important to note that BF3 is not an ideal 
proportional counter gas, so the maximum allowed pressure in the detector is slightly 
above one atmosphere as seen in Fig. 19. Since the detector configuration is at such a 
low pressure, relative to 
3
He tubes, a larger detector vessel containing BF3 would be 
allowed without violating safety constraints.  
The ideal prototype boron loaded cloud chamber for vehicle crossing check 
points would consist of: a large emulsion chamber like detector, similar to those 
referenced in Sec. II.B.1, containing BF3 at 1.2 atmospheres surrounded completely by a 
series of HPGe detectors. In this configuration a neutron would enter the BF3 vessel and 
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undergo a 
10
B(n,α) reaction. The reactant heavy charged particles would then create 
ionized tracks visible to the CCD, and the resulting de-excitation gamma-ray would be 
detected in the HPGe detectors surrounding the BF3 well. The energy and angles for 
each of these reactant particles would be recorded, and the incoming neutron direction 
vector could be calculated via the methods mentioned in Sec. III.D.1.  
V.B. Boron Loaded Semiconductor  
In the previous section the proposed boron loaded cloud chamber used BF3 gas as 
its main neutron detecting medium. BF3 and other boron loaded gases have been 
developed and benchmarked for over three decades. Conversely a boron loaded 
semiconductor material that would meet the durability and efficiency requirements of 
RPMs does not currently exist. The neutron semiconductor detectors that do exist are of 
the coated and perforated semiconductor types mentioned in Sec.II.B.4. In this section 
the implementation of boron to these coated semiconductors will be analyzed, and a 
hypothetical, prototype, boron doped semiconductor detector for vehicle crossing 
stations will be introduced. 
With a thin layer of 
10B deposited on the surface of a semiconductor, “the 
maximum thermal neutron detection efficiency for a single-coated planar device [is] 
4.0%.
38”The neutron absorption efficiency was found to be so low due to the lack of 
thickness of neutron absorbing 
10
B, and a peeling and delamination of the coatings from 
thin-film stresses introduced by the evaporative disposition.
38
 In order to increase the 
film adhesion to the device surface, tiny holes were etched into the diode barrier surface 
before applying the layer of 
10
B. Not only did this increase the film adhesion, but it also 
increased the amount of 
10
B in the semiconductor which increased the probability of 
interaction. The new etched approach, seen in Fig. 20, increased the neutron efficiency 
to 13%.
38
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Fig. 20. Conceptual illustration of the basic circular hole design. The holes shown are 
subsequently shown with neutron reactive 
10
B. 
 
Although the neutron detection efficiency has been increased due to etching, the 
amount of energy the reactant particles can impart in  the semiconductor decreases, thus 
decreasing the detectors overall energy resolution. A cross-sectional image of several 
neutron interaction locations inside the etched semiconductor well loaded with 
10
B can 
be seen in Fig. 21., where the cap depth in Fig. 21 is the thickness of the 
10
B layer 
imparted on the semiconductor.  
In reactions 3,4, and 6 of Fig. 21 above only half of the reactant particles have a 
path through the semiconductor detector. Since one, or both, of the reactant particles are 
not detected, the neutron direction vector reconstruction techniques outlined in Sec. III. 
D. 2 can no longer be applied.  
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Fig. 21. Cross-sectional view of neutron interaction locations inside an etched 
semiconductor well loaded with 
10
B. 
 
In order to receive the full energy deposition for both heavy charged reactant 
particles in the 
10B(n,α) reaction, the 10B must be embedded  completely in the material. 
One such material which has 
10
B in it and is already used in nuclear reactors is B4C. 
Although B4C is one of the strongest materials known to man
39
, its low electric 
conductivity makes it a poor choice to use as a detector medium. If scientific methods 
find a way to improve the conductivity of B4C without losing its boron concentration, a 
prototypical slab type detector would be ideal. This prototype B4C detector would 
consists of a series of rotating slab detectors on either side of the vehicle crossing 
checkpoint. These detectors would hypothetically be robust, and have a large enough 
detector efficiency and resolution to replicate the incoming neutron direction vector via 
methods discussed in Sec. III.D.2. 
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CHAPTER VI 
MCNPX SIMULATIONS AND DOPPLER BROADENING CODE 
DEVELOPMENT 
VI.A. Baseline Modeling of Existing RPMs in MCNPX 
The first step when creating any new detector configuration is to benchmark an 
existing detector configuration for comparison. Therefore, a baseline model of the 
existing RPM at vehicle crossing checkpoints was created in MCNPX.  In Sec. II.A.2 a 
smuggling scenario was referenced in which a shielded HEU source was placed in a 
briefcase and passed safely through a pedestrian checkpoint containing an RPM.  The 
goal of this section is to recreate a simulation containing a vehicular version of this same 
smuggling scenario, and observe the RPMs ability to detect the HEU.  
Initially, a replica of the RPM discussed in Sec. II.A.1 was recreated in MCNPX. 
Six 
3
He cylindrical tubes 6.6 cm in diameter and 89 cm tall were modeled. These 
3
He 
tubes were embedded in 2.54 cm of polyethylene for neutron moderation purposes. In 
front of the 
3
He tubes, relative to the vehicles position, two PVT scintillators were 
placed side by side with dimensions 39 cm x 4 cm x 90.75 cm. A cross sectional 
representation of the modeled RPM detector can be seen in Fig. 22.  
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Fig. 22. Illustrated model of the MCNPX created RPM, and adjacent vehicle with 
HEU in its trunk. The six cylinders in the RPM are the 
3
He tubes, and the flat blue and 
pink plates in front of the 
3
He tubes are the PVT detectors. 
 
The four piece object located in front of the RPM  in Fig. 22 is a simplistic 
design for a motor vehicle.  The front compartment (colored yellow in Fig. 22) 
represents the engine block and is composed entirely of steel.  The adjacent two blocks 
(colored orange and light blue in Fig. 22) represent the passenger compartments 
comprised of air surrounded by a thin wall of steel. The rear compartment (colored navy 
blue in Fig. 22) is also a thin steel walled segment representing the vehicles trunk. The 
lower half of the trunk contains the chemical composition of gasoline, and the upper half 
contains a 70 at% enriched HEU sphere (500g of U) shielded in concentric spheres of 
polyethylene and lead. The detector and the vehicle are sitting on top of an earthlike 
material composed of light metals, carbon and oxygen. Above the ground the detector 
and the vehicle are surrounded by air composed of nitrogen, carbon, and oxygen. 
MCNPX will perform a simulation of this vehicle in the location illustrated in Fig. 22, 
observing the number of 
3
He(n,p) reactions that occur. Two neutron based simulations 
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will be performed, the first involves using the shielded HEU as a source emitting 
neutrons at a rate defined by the source properties, in this case 500 g of 70at% enriched 
HEU providing 2.144 neutrons per second, with an energy distribution equal to the 
Watt’s spontaneous fission spectrum for 240Pu. The Watt’s fission spectrum for 240Pu 
was chosen because the spontaneous fission spectrum of 
238
U is not included in the 
MCNPX library, and the two energy spectrums are nearly identical. The second neutron 
source was background cosmic neutrons emitted randomly from the air surrounding the 
vehicle and detector.  
VI.B. BF
3
 Cloud Chamber Modeling in MCNPX and Doppler Broadening 
Algorithm Creation 
The next step of this research was to model the prototype BF
3
 cloud chamber 
described in Sec. IV.A in MCNPX. Since simulations on BF
3
 gas have been previously 
researched and its efficiency described in Sec.IV.A, the goal in modeling a BF3 cloud 
chamber detector was to acquire reactant particle information for the creation of a 
Doppler broadening algorithm.  
A cylindrical canister of BF
3
 gas, 2 m in diameter by 1 m in height centered at 
the origin, was modeled in MCNPX. The boron in the BF
3
 gas was enriched to 90wt% 
10
B, and held at 1 atm with a gas density of 0.00276 g/cm3. The BF
3
 canister was then 
surrounded completely by a cylindrical shell of 32Ge 5 cm thick. A model of the BF
3
 
canister and surrounding 
32
Ge shell, with the top 
32
Ge portion removed, can be seen in 
Fig. 23. The three red spheres in Fig. 23 represent possible source locations for the 
simulation. 
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Fig. 23. MCNPX model of a BF3 prototype cloud chamber surrounded by 
32
Ge. The 
three red spheres represent possible neutron source locations. 
 
The source position decided upon was the top red sphere seen in  Fig. 23, located 
2 m above the center of the BF3 cloud chamber. Two separate simulations were 
performed using thermal and 1 MeV neutrons with a collimated neutron source direction 
vector emitting neutrons in the direction (0,0,-1).    
The interaction information from the MCNPX simulations which included 
particle energies, directions, and reaction types, were listed in an output file using 
MCNPXs PTRAC feature. A script was then created using the C programming language 
to filter through the PTRAC output file to extract and store particle interaction 
information for every excited state 
10
B(n,α) reaction that occurred. The C script would 
then use this interaction information and the mathematics described in Sec. III.B to 
Doppler broaden the de-excitation gamma-rays from the simulation. A spectrum of these 
simulated de-excitation photons were then compared to the analytic and experimental 
Doppler broadened photons seen in Fig. 11. 
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VI.C. Initial MCNPX Boron Semiconductor Loading and Efficiency Simulations 
Before a prototype RPM using a boron loaded semiconductor can be simulated, a 
better understanding of the detection properties of boron loaded inside of a 
semiconductor detector was required. To do this, simulations were performed in 
MCNPX to find thresholds for detector efficiency by varying boron enrichment and 
boron semiconductor thickness.  
To determine the threshold for detector efficiency with respect to boron 
enrichment, a borated-silicon detector was modeled in MCNPX. The simulation 
geometry consisted of a 5 mm borated-silicon wafer with a density of 2.34 g/cm
3
 
containing 0.01wt% 
10
B. The borated-silicon wafer was sandwiched between 2, 1 mm 
thick, pure 
14
Si wafers with a density of 2.33g/cm
3
. A plate approach for the simulation 
geometry was selected to mimic the boron loaded semiconductors discussed in Sec. 
IV.B.   A collimated thermal neutron source emitting neutrons at 2.144 neutrons per 
second was then impinged on the center of the sandwiched detector configuration, and 
the 
10B(n,α) reaction efficiency was calculated. The simulation was then repeated 
increasing the 
10
B enrichment to values of 0.1 wt%, 0.5 wt%, 1 wt%, 5 wt%, and 10 
wt%, and respective 
10B(n,α) reaction efficiencies were calculated. 
The simulation to determine a threshold for a boron loaded semiconductor plate 
thickness more closely resembled the detector configuration discussed in Sec. IV.B. In 
this scenario the vehicle and shielded HEU models from Sec. V.A were replicated. 
However, the RPM detector configuration in Sec. V.A was replaced by a homogenized 
plate of B4C and 
14
Si isotopically consisting of 17.3 wt% 
10
B, 2 wt% 
11
B, 5.7 wt% 
12
C, 
and 75 wt% 
14
Si. The homogenized plate had dimensions of 1 m wide x 3 cm thick x 
1.45 m tall and a density of 2.34 g/cm
3
. The plate detector configuration is illustrated in  
Fig. 24 below.  
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Fig. 24. Model of the vehicle and B4C plate detector used in MCNPX 
 
The shielded HEU source from Sec. V.A was used with the neutron source 
strength of 2.144 neutrons per second, and the same 
240Pu Watt’s fission spectrum 
energy distribution. A tally for total neutron reactions in the B4C homogenized plate 
were recorded, and a 
10B(n,α) reaction efficiency was calculated. This simulation was 
then replicated, increasing the plate thickness in increments of 2cm from 5 cm to 35 cm, 
and respective 
10B(n,α) reaction efficiencies were calculated. 
VI.D. B4C Detector Simulations 
After an acceptable 
10
B enrichment and B4C thickness were selected, simulations 
for a prototype B4C semiconductor detector were created. The detector configuration 
chosen was a half cylindrical shell of B4C divided into four separate, symmetric, pieces. 
One set of the half cylindrical shell configuration was placed on either side of the 
simulated vehicle lane. The diameter of both shells was 2 m, and the height of both 
shells was 1.7 m. The modeled vehicle and HEU shielded from previous sections were 
again used, and various simulations were performed with the vehicle approaching the 
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detectors, passing between the detectors, and moving away from the detectors.  The 
purpose of simulating the vehicle at separate points was to imitate the lifelike scenario of 
a vehicle passing through a vehicle monitoring station. A representation of the detector 
configuration with the modeled vehicle can be seen in Fig. 25. 
 
 
Fig. 25. B4C detector half cylinder detector configuration with a model vehicle between 
the two detectors. 
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CHAPTER VII 
RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
VII.A. Baseline RPM Results 
As mentioned in Sec. V.A, the purpose of simulating the existing RPM detector 
configuration was to determine its capability to detect shielded HEU in a smuggling 
scenario. The results from the HEU and background source simulations in MCNPX can 
be seen in Table 4.  
Table 4. 
RPM Baseline Simulation Results. 
Configuration
3He(n,p) Reactions 
per second 
HEU Source Only
Background Only
1.40E-04
2.51E-01  
 
When looking at Table 4 there are two elements that incite concern. The first is 
the exceedingly low 
3
He(n,p) reaction rate inside the 
3
He neutron detectors. A count rate 
on the order of 1E-4 counts per second would require the count time of the vehicle to be 
exceedingly long to achieve sufficient statistics. As an example, these results illustrate 
that if a vehicle containing a shielded HEU source were parked in front of an RPM 
detector configuration for an hour, less than one neutron would be detected in the 
3
He 
tubes from the HEU source. The second troubling element to be noted is the relationship 
between the source strength and background strength. Not only would an excessive 
count time be required for a shielded HEU source, the counts received from background 
alone would make the very few counts received from the HEU source become 
indistinguishable. Due to the concerning results from this model, it is verified with a 
resounding certainty that the existing RPMs at vehicle crossing checkpoints are 
incapable of distinguishing  neutrons from a shielded HEU source. Therefore, the 
research to upgrade the existing RPMs at vehicle crossing checkpoints is warranted. 
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VII.B. BF3 Cloud Chamber Simulation and Doppler Broadening Algorithm Results 
The primary goal of the BF3 cloud chamber simulations was to verify that 
MCNPX could accurately handle the Doppler broadening of de-excitation photons from 
the 
10B(n,α) reaction. After the BF3 cloud chamber was modeled in MCNPX and a few 
baseline simulations were performed, it was confirmed that MCNPX was in fact, not 
applying the correct Doppler broadening mathematics to the de-excitation gamma-rays. 
MCNPXs PTRAC function was used to list parameters for every particle interaction that 
occurred. The simulation variables that are listed by PTRAC include particle location, 
energy, direction, reaction type, and the time the reaction occurred. After looking at the 
first few listed de-excitation gamma-ray reactions, it quickly became evident that there 
was not a conservation of energy between reactant particles and the incoming neutron 
via the manner described in Sec. III.B. A conservation was not applied to reactant 
particles because of the way the random MC method operates. MCNPX simulates the 
complete neutron lifetime first, including the locations of every interaction site, and then 
samples the types of interactions that occur at said interaction sites using reaction 
probabilities. Therefore, when MCNPX decides that a 
10B(n,α) reaction occurs, a 
random distribution of directions are given to the reactant 
7
Li
*
 and 
4
He particles instead 
of the required distributions that obey the conservation principles outlined in Equations  
3-10. Since the particle information listed by PTRAC did not obey the appropriate 
conservation equations, the Doppler broadening of the de-excitation gamma-ray could 
not be calculated.  
To correctly Doppler broaden the MNCPX simulated de-excitation gamma-rays, 
the Doppler broadening algorithm mentioned in Section V.B was created. The algorithm 
used the mathematics described in Equation 11 in conjunction with the PTRAC listed 
energy and direction of the 
7
Li
*
 particle, and a randomly generated angle for the de-
excitation gamma-ray sampled from 4π distribution to produce the results seen in Fig. 
26. 
  
 53 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 26. MCNPX Doppler broadened gamma-rays versus experimentally Doppler 
broadened gamma-rays created from the thermal neutron reaction 
10B(n,α). 
 
As is seen in Fig. 26, the MCNPX spectrum matches up very well with the 
experimental Doppler broadened spectrum. The slight difference between the two 
spectra reside in the edges of the Doppler broadened “hump” in the simulated data, 
which can be attributed to the exclusion  of detector resolution  in the simulation similar 
to Fig. 11. The difference between the MCNPX spectrum and the experimental spectrum 
for energies greater than 486 keV can be attributed to background noise in the 
experimental system. Likewise, for energies below 470 keV the difference between the 
spectrums can be attributed to background noise, as well as additional counts from the 
Compton distribution for gamma-rays in the de-excitation “hump”. Due to the similarity 
between the spectrums presented in Fig.26, the accuracy and validation of the de-
excitation Doppler broadening algorithm created in the C programming language is 
confirmed.   
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VII.C. B4C Simulation Results 
VII.C.1. Boron Enrichment and B4C Thickness Simulations 
Before a prototype B4C vehicle monitoring detector could be modeled in 
MCNPX, a set of primary simulations were required to determine basic detector 
parameters such as boron enrichment and semiconductor plate thickness. In order to 
determine the ideal enrichment of 
10
B in a boron loaded semiconductor, several MCNPX 
simulations were performed on a slab of borated silicon with varying 
10
B enrichments.  
The borated silicon was sandwiched between two thin sheets of 
14
Si to more closely 
resemble detector configurations discussed in Sec. IV.B. The results from these 
simulations are shown in Fig. 27.  
 
Fig. 27. Simulation results for 
10
B enrichment in a borated silicon wafer. 
 
The results from the 
10
B enrichment simulations are successful at giving 
information about two key detector characteristics in boron loaded semiconductors. The 
first is that small levels of boron enrichment are capable of producing the same detector 
efficiency as larger enrichments as seen in Fig. 27. Therefore, due to the amount of 
10
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in commercially available B4C, which is approximately 75 wt%, further enrichment of 
10
B in later simulated B4C is not necessary. Results from Fig. 27 also provide 
information about the necessary size of the detector. The capability of the 5 mm thick 
borated silicon detector configuration to capture nearly half of the 2.144 thermal 
neutrons emitted per second is promising. These capture efficiency results lend credence 
to the idea that an increased detector thickness can increase the overall detection 
efficiency in the system.  
To determine B4C thickness characteristics in a vehicle monitoring scenario, 
simulations were performed varying plate thicknesses of B4C with the same shielded 
HEU neutron source used in the benchmark simulations. The results from these 
simulations are depicted in Fig. 28. 
 
Fig. 28. Detection efficiency versus B4C thickness. 
 
The first major discrepancy between the results displayed in Fig. 27 and Fig. 28 
is the drop in absolute detection efficiency. This drop in detection efficiency is attributed 
to the difference in energy spectrums for each simulation. The results of Fig. 27 are 
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based on a thermal neutron energy spectrum used specifically to determine the effect of 
modifying 
10
B enrichment. Conversely, the results of Fig. 28 use a higher energy, 
240
Pu 
Watt’s spontaneous fission spectrum, in order to mimic vehicle monitoring station 
scenarios. Since the increase in detection efficiency plateaus at a B4C thickness of 25 
cm, the thickness of all B4C semiconductor detectors simulated after this was 25 cm. It is 
important to mention that although an absolute detection efficiency of 12% seems low 
compared to the thermal neutron simulation of Fig. 27, the detection efficiency of the 
large B4C plate detectors seen in Fig.28 is nearly 100 times greater than those seen in 
Fig. 19 using a 
252
Cf source and BF3 tubes.  
VII.C.2. B4C Prototype Vehicle Monitor Results 
After the 
10
B enrichment and B4C plate thickness was selected, the remaining 
element before creating a prototype B4C vehicle monitor was to decide upon a geometric 
configuration. Since a crucial element of almost every safety system or detection 
configuration involves redundancy, the goal was to create a geometric B4C configuration 
such that it had redundant directionality capabilities. Along with the material properties 
of B4C that enable it to reconstruct an incoming neutrons direction vector, a geometric 
detector configuration was designed that would use raw count data to provide directional 
information about the source location. The system conceived was a pair of 25 cm thick 
half cylindrical shell detectors described in Sec. V.D. The results of the moving vehicle 
simulations using half cylindrical shell detectors can be seen in Fig. 29. A revised 
version of Fig. 25 displaying detector quadrant numbers can be seen in Fig. 30. 
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Fig. 29. Simulation results for a mock vehicle passing through two half cylindrical B4C 
detectors. Each B4C detector was divided into quadrants leaving eight total detector 
pieces to accumulate count data. 
 
 By simply observing the shape of the count information received by 
separate detector pieces seen in Fig. 29, the location of the incoming HEU source can be 
inferred. Since detector pieces 1 and 8 have the greatest solid angle relative to the 
approaching vehicle, the shape of the function of their counts maximizes after the trunk 
of the vehicle passes through the center of the detector. Similarly, the shape of the counts 
function for detector pieces 4 and 8 maximize shortly after the entire vehicle passes 
through the detector configuration. This is again due to the large solid angle that these 
detector pieces posses for a vehicle traveling away from the detector configuration. If the 
count information for every detector piece were summed, the maximum of the count 
shape function would occur when the HEU source passes through the center of the half 
cylinder detectors.  
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Since the HEU source is located in the trunk of the vehicle, the expected crest of 
the summed count function should occur as the vehicle is slightly past the focal point of 
the half cylinder detector. This is precisely the case, as seen in Fig. 29, thus the ability 
for the half cylindrical detector configurations to geometrically provide directionality 
information is verified.  
 
 
Fig. 30. Half cylindrical B4C detector configuration with numbered detector quadrants. 
In the moving vehicle simulation the vehicle travels from left to right relative to this 
depicted configuration. The HEU source is in the trunk of the vehicle. 
 
It is also important to note that due to the size of these detector configurations, 
the overall count rate in the prototype vehicle monitor is increased by a factor of nearly 
100 when compared to the existing RPM detectors. An example of this can be seen by 
comparing the benchmark RPM count rate information received from the source only 
simulation in Table 4, with the count rate information of the half cylindrical B4C 
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detectors seen in Fig. 29. Both of these simulations used a neutron source with identical 
emission rates and energy spectrums.  
VII.D. Inverse Analysis Results 
With the verification of the Doppler broadening algorithm and two prototype 
detector configurations successfully simulated, the next step was to recreate the 
incoming neutron direction vector for both prototype detector simulations using the 
methods described in Sec. III.D.  
VII.D.1. Recreating BF3 Cloud Chamber Incoming Neutron Vectors 
As described in Sec. III.D.1., recreating neutron direction vectors from cloud 
chamber detector data is simply a matter of applying conservation principles. Using 
Equations 13-15 in conjunction with the manufactured α information from Equations 16-
18, Equations 13-15 can be used to calculate the incoming neutron direction vectors for 
the simulation described in Sec. V.B. Some of the recalculated neutron information from 
the BF3 prototype detector simulation can be seen in Table 5.  
Since the recreated neutron direction cosines are calculated using manufactured 
solutions of  α particles, and the manufactured solutions for α are created from a 
modified version of the same equations, the difference between the two simulated and 
recreated directions should be attributed only to round off error. In Table 5, the recreated 
neutron direction cosines calculated were so precise that there was not a difference 
between the calculated and simulated neutron direction information.  
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Table 5.  
MCNPX Neutron Information Versus Recreated Neutron Information. 
Particle # un vn wn θn·li  ( ° ) un vn wn θn·li ( ° )
7 0 0 -1 97.70 0 0 -1 97.70 0
223 -0.7802 0.35724 -0.5135 110.84 -0.7802 0.35724 -0.5135 110.84 0
248 0.0914 -0.7264 -0.6812 157.96 0.0914 -0.7264 -0.6812 157.96 0
309 0 0 -1 63.98 0 0 -1 63.98 0
375 -0.4795 -0.4304 -0.7648 97.42 -0.4795 -0.4304 -0.7648 97.42 0
691 0.0381 0.21698 -0.9754 59.92 0.0381 0.21698 -0.9754 59.92 0
868 0 0 -1 52.02 0 0 -1 52.02 0
900 -0.5465 -0.3798 -0.7464 41.36 -0.5465 -0.3798 -0.7464 41.36 0
904 0.68442 0.56711 -0.4582 123.47 0.68442 0.56711 -0.4582 123.47 0
Δθ
MCNPX Neutron Direction Cosine Recreated Neutron Direction Cosine
 Δθ: The difference in angle in degrees between the MCNPX direction vector, and the 
recalculated neutron direction vector. 
VII.D.2. Recreating B4C Semiconductor Incoming Neutron Vectors 
To recreate incoming neutron direction information from B4C semiconductor 
detectors, a directional triangulation from multiple incoming neutron cone surface 
solution sets is required. The neutron cone surface solution sets are created using de-
excitation gamma-ray information in conjunction with the method of superposition of 
cones discussed in Chapter IV to create a neutron cone surface, numerical methods are 
used to calculate and iterate upon possible 
7
Li
*
 and neutron direction cosines that 
validate Equation 21. Since iterative methods are not discussed in this research, the 
recreated incoming neutron direction vector can be validated by verifying that the 
calculated and simulated variables that make Equation 21 equal to zero. These variables 
as well as the method by which they were obtained are outlined in Table 6.  
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Table 6.  
Variable Information Used in Equation 21 to Calculate a Neutron Cone Surface. 
Particle U V W
n -0.1455 -0.4122 0.3027
7
Li
* -0.2737 -0.7753 0.5693
γ
* -0.5898 0.7672 -0.2521
54.77
112.17
θγ*·Li 
(degrees)
θn·Li 
(degrees)
X
Numerical Iteration MCNPX Data
X
X
Calculated Data
X
X
 
The variable information from Table 7 is then inserted into Equation 21 to 
determine if the neutron direction vector created from the numerical simulation lies on 
the neutron cone surface. If the incoming neutron direction vector does lie on the cone 
surface, S(u) should equal zero. The particle information from Table 6 applied to 
Equation 21 can be seen in Table 7. 
Table 7.  
Evaluation of Variables from Table 6 in Equation 21. 
Degrees
(u,v,w)γ* · (u,v,w)Li 54.77
(u,v,w)n · (u,v,w)Li 110.84
θγ*·Li 54.77
θn·Li 112.17
S (u)  1.33
 
 
The difference in the value for the solution of Equation 21 seen in Table 7, and 
the expected value of zero can be attributed to mathematical round off error from 
Equations13-15. Although the evaluation data of Table 7 does not exactly equal zero, the 
error is small enough to accurately presume the neutron direction vector used to attain 
these results lies on the surface of the neutron cone. If multiple 
10B(n,α) interactions 
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occurred in the same region, a triangulation of neutron surface cones would give the 
incoming neutron direction vector for the neutron source.  
VII.E. Sensitivity Analysis Results  
The methods of Chapter IV have outlined the process for recreating the incoming 
neutron’s direction vector in two detector configurations. It is now important to 
understand the sensitivity these processes have to small perturbations in detected data. In 
order to equally compare the sensitivity in both detector configurations, “deviation” 
coefficients were created based off of each detector’s capabilities. Since the detectors 
response to the accuracy with which it records energy and angle information is vital to 
recreating the incoming neutron direction vector, detector energy and angle resolution 
were chosen as these coefficients. For the cloud chamber, energy and angular resolutions 
of 5 KeV and 0.2° were used. For the semiconductor detector, energy and angular 
resolutions of 10 KeV and 0.5° were used.  To test the sensitivity of the neutron 
direction vector recreation process, the data received by the detector was perturbed by 
units of detector resolution, or “deviations”, and the affects were observed. After the 
incoming neutron direction vectors have been calculated for both prototype detector 
configurations, a representation of the sensitivity to detector accuracy was desired. In 
order to determine this sensitivity, the MCNPX simulation data was altered by a 
sensitivity coefficient and the results were observed. 
VII.E.1. Sensitivity Analysis for the BF3 Cloud Chamber 
The sensitivity of the calculated incoming neutron direction to a series of 
perturbations on the 
7
Li
*
 energy and direction information received from MCNPX was 
determined. These results are displayed in Table 8.  
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Table 8.  
Sensitivity Results for Perturbations of the 
7
Li
*
 Particle Direction Vector in the 
Prototype BF3 Cloud Chamber Detector. 
0 ----
1 5.1358
2 3.1905
3 2.6455
4 2.4083
5 2.2838
0.4075
Induced 
Perterbation 
(degrees)
# Of 
Deviations
0.6186
0.8323
Sensitivity 
Coefficient
1.0490
1.0124
1.3001
1.6365
2.0044
2.3957
Difference Between 
Calculated and 
MCNPX Neutron 
Vector (degrees)
0.0000 0.8102
0.1971
 
 
Observing the results from Table 8, the difference between the calculated neutron 
direction vector, and the MCNPX produced neutron vector is less than three degrees at 
five sensitivity deviations. The discrepancy between the calculated and simulated 
neutron direction vectors at zero perturbations can be attributed to round off error in the 
mathematics. The sensitivity coefficient, which is defined as a ratio of the induced 
7
Li
*
 
angular perturbations to the difference between simulated and calculated neutron 
vectors, is a good quantification for the relationship between the number of deviations 
and the difference in the calculated neutron vector. As indicated by Table 8, the 
difference in neutron vectors is most sensitive to the first sensitivity deviation, and then 
decreases with every following sensitivity deviation.  The results for perturbing both 
angle and energy information is seen in Table 9. 
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Table 9.  
Sensitivity Results for Perturbations of the 
7
Li
*
 Particle Energy and Direction Vector in 
the Prototype BF3 Cloud Chamber Detector. 
0 ----
1 5.9062
2 3.7221
3 3.0169
4 2.6584
5 2.4361
0.6186 1.8663
0.8323 2.2126
1.0490 2.5555
0.0150
0.0200
0.0250
0.0000 0.8102
0.1971 1.1643
0.4075 1.5167
0.0000
0.0050
0.0100
# Of 
Deviations
Induced Angular 
Perterbation 
(degrees)
Difference Between 
Calculated and 
MCNPX Neutron 
Vector (degrees)
Sensitivity 
Coefficient
Induced Energy 
Perterbation (MeV)
 
 
The results of Table 9 conclude that perturbing both angle and energy in the 
system slightly increase the difference in angle between the calculated and simulated 
neutron vector. The increase is nearly negligible however, and it is still important to note 
that the difference in angle at five sensitivity perturbations is less than three degrees.  
VII.E.2. Sensitivity Analysis for the B4C Semiconductor Detector 
A sensitivity analysis was also performed for the prototype B4C semiconductor 
detector. Similar to the previous section, an analysis on the effect of perturbing the 
7
Li
*
 
direction vector alone is compared with perturbing both the direction vector and energy 
of the 
7
Li
*
 particle. Results from the direction vector only perturbation can be seen in 
Table 10.  
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Table 10.  
Sensitivity Results for Perturbations of the 
7
Li* Particle Direction Vector in the 
Prototype B4C Semiconductor Detector. 
0 ----
1 3.8518
2 2.5268
3 2.0888
4 1.8703
5 1.73942.4123 4.1959
1.4769 3.0848
1.9495 3.6461
0.5002 1.9268
0.9941 2.5118
0.0000 1.3296
Induced 
Perterbation 
(degrees)
Difference Between 
Calculated and 
MCNPX Neutron 
Vector (degrees)
Sensitivity 
Coefficient
# Of 
Deviations
 
 
The results from Table 10 show a larger difference between the calculated and 
simulated neutron direction vector as well as a lower sensitivity coefficient. At five 
sensitivity perturbations, the difference between the two direction vectors is almost 
double the values seen in a cloud chamber detector.  The larger difference in calculated 
angle can be attributed to lower semiconductor angular resolution and mathematic round 
off error. Because a semiconductor detector has a lower angular resolution relative to a 
cloud chamber, the deviation coefficient increases. With a larger deviation coefficient, 
the induced perturbation per deviation increases, thus increasing the difference between 
the calculated and simulated neutron direction vector relative to a cloud chamber.  
The increase in deviation coefficient also plays a factor in the decrease of the 
sensitivity coefficient. Due to the definition of the sensitivity coefficient, having a larger 
deviation coefficient increases the denominator of the coefficient, thus decreasing its 
overall value. It is also important to note that due to the mathematics behind direction 
vector reconstruction in semiconductor detectors, the angular difference attributed to 
round off error is also greater than that of a cloud chamber detector. The results from 
perturbing both the energy and direction vector of the 
7
Li
*
 reactant particle in a 
semiconductor detector can be seen in Table 11.  
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Table 11.  
Sensitivity Results for Perturbations of the 
7
Li* Particle Energy and Direction Vector in 
the Prototype B4C Semiconductor Detector. 
0 ----
1 5.8032
2 4.5094
3 4.1101
4 3.9326
5 3.8441
# Of 
Deviations
Induced Angular 
Perterbation 
(degrees)
Induced Energy 
Perterbation (MeV)
Difference Between 
Calculated and 
MCNPX Neutron 
Vector (degrees)
Sensitivity 
Coefficient
0.0000
0.0100
1.3296
0.5002 2.9030
0.0000
0.9941 0.0200 4.4828
2.4123 0.0500 9.2732
1.4769 0.0300 6.0701
1.9495 0.0400 7.6664
 
 
 Similar to results from Table 9, the difference between simulated and calculated 
neutron vectors increase when both energy and direction are perturbed. At five 
sensitivity deviations, the difference in direction vector for a semiconductor is roughly 
five times what it is in a cloud chamber detector. The difference in the calculated angle 
is larger in a semiconductor detector because of the increased deviation coefficient and a 
lack of information about reactant particles. Since only the energy of the reactant 
particles are known in a semiconductor detector, the process of manufacturing the 
reactant particles angular information introduces additional error into the system.  It is 
important to note that if these results were treated as a Gaussian distribution, where there 
would be greater than a 99.6% probability the solution would lie within three deviations, 
an error of six degrees for the incoming neutron vector is more than acceptable.  
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CHAPTER VIII  
FINALIZED DETECTOR DESIGN 
It has been shown in this research that there are many advantages to using a 
semiconductor detector configuration. Therefore, a combination of B4C and 
14
Si  will be 
used for the newly proposed RPM detector configuration. Due to the results from 
simulated detector enrichment calculations, the standard enrichment of 75wt%
10
B in B4C 
is acceptable. Using commercially available B4C allows for an economic advantage due 
to its accessibility from wide use in nuclear reactor configurations.  
  The new RPM detector will consist of 5 mm thick plates of B4C sandwiched 
between 1mm plates of 
14
Si. In order to reach the nominal B4C thickness of 25 cm, 250 
of these B4C plate configurations will be stacked together. The stacked plates of B4C and 
14
Si will be molded into a half cylindrical shell type detector, similar to the configuration 
seen in Fig. 25. The detector will stand 1 m tall and have a diameter of 2 meters.  
A single half cylindrical B4C detector divided into quadrants will be placed on 
either side of the vehicle lane. The focal point of the half cylindrical configuration 
should be located approximately 1 m from the edge of the lane. A rotatable motor will 
then be placed underneath the bottom of each detector quadrant to aid in SNM detection 
in lanes near the detector. The inclusion of rotation capable detector quadrants increases 
the geometric directional capabilities in the system.  By rotating the detector quadrants 
in adjacent lanes to face one containing SIM, the solid angle for multiple detectors is 
increased, thus increasing the capability for larger detection efficiency.  
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CHAPTER IX 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The increased probability of nuclear attack and the dated technology with which 
RPMs are created, inspired research into the field of directionally sensitive neutron 
detectors. Before new prototype detector configurations could be considered, a series of 
smuggling simulations were performed in MCNPX on existing RPMS to determine the 
probability of detection. A shielded 500 g HEU source at 70at% had an active count rate 
of 1.40E-4 neutrons per second. A count rate as low as this would require the vehicle to 
remain in front of the detector for over an hour to accumulate the same amount of 
neutrons detected in one second of background irradiation.  
After the fallibilities in existing RPM detector configurations were shown, the 
methods to creating a direction sensitive neutron detector were discussed. Among these 
methods, the uniqueness of the Doppler broadened 
7
Li
*
 de-excitation gamma-ray was 
highlighted. Experimental and analytical results were shown to prove the existence of 
the Doppler broadened gamma-ray. It was then shown that by using this de-excitation 
gamma-ray information in conjunction with the other reactant particle information from 
the 
10B(n,α) reaction, the incoming neutron direction vector could be reconstructed. 
Using conservation principles and the method of cone superposition, the mathematics for 
recreating the incoming neutron direction vector in a boron loaded cloud chamber and 
boron loaded semiconductor were derived.  
Simulations in MCNPX were performed on a cloud chamber loaded with BF3 to 
determine if MCNPX could accurately Doppler broaden the 
7
Li
*
 de-excitation gamma-
rays. Once it was determined that MCNPX did not Doppler broaden these gamma-rays, a 
Doppler broadening algorithm was created. The algorithm was created using the C 
programming language and made use of MCNPXs PTRAC function to manually 
Doppler broaden de-excitation gamma-ray produced from the simulation. This spectrum 
of created Doppler broadened de-excitation gamma-rays was then compared to the 
simulated and analytical spectrums and matched with a high degree of accuracy.  
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Further simulations were performed in MCNPX to provide detector characteristic 
information about boron loaded semiconductors. Using the aforementioned 500 g  HEU 
source emitting 2.144 thermal neutrons per second, the detection efficiency for a 5 mm 
thick 
10
B doped 
14
Si plate detector  was found to plateau at 50%,  with a corresponding 
10
B enrichment of 3wt%. Another simulation performed in MCNPX found that the ideal 
plate thickness for a B4C semiconductor detector at 
10
B enrichment of 75wt% was 25 cm 
thick.  Further simulations in MCNPX were performed on a half cylindrical shell of B4C 
plate detectors to determine the systems geometric directional capability. These 
simulations not only showed  that the detector configuration was capable of locating the 
direction of a neutron source from raw count information alone, but also the B4C plate 
detectors increased the neutron count rate to the order of 2E-02 counts per second. 
MCNPX were then performed simulations on both a prototype 
10
B loaded cloud 
chamber and prototype 
10
B loaded semiconductor detector were performed, and 
incoming neutron direction vectors from each detector configuration were recalculated 
using the simulated particle reactant data provided by PTRAC. A sensitivity analysis 
was then performed on each detector configurations ability to accurately reconstruct 
incoming neutron direction vectors. By modifying the energy and direction vector of the 
simulated PTRAC output data for 
7
Li
*
 particles, three deviation coefficients showed a 
respective angular uncertainty of 1.86° and 6.07° for a boron loaded cloud chamber and 
a boron loaded semiconductor.   
Lastly, a new B4C half cylindrical RPM detector configuration was described. 
The B4C detector would be 1 m tall x 2 m in diameter x 25 cm thick, with a 
10
B 
enrichment of 75wt%. Each half cylindrical detector configuration would be divided into 
quadrants that could be rotated to maximize geometric detection efficiency.  
The robustness and increased detection efficiencies of a B4C prototype RPM give 
it an attractive advantage over the dated RPM detectors currently in service. Future work 
in this area of research should be performed on increasing the neutron angular detection 
efficiency in semiconductor detectors, as well as improving the directional detection 
capability of sandwiched 
14
Si Detectors. Although there are certain technological factors 
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that prevent a B4C detector configuration from being created in the present, the ideas and 
methods presented in this research offer insight into the possibilities of using 
10
B for 
neutron direction reconstruction.  
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APPENDIX 
A. MCNPX SIMULATIONS 
 
A.1. MCNPX RPM Card 
Message: outp=n1.o runtpe=run1.r mctal=heus.m 
 
500g HEU Sphere @ 70% enrinchment neutron Spont Fission decay 
c Cell Card 
c 
 29  1  -0.0029  -101                     imp:n=1 $ Air inside hollow sphere 
 30  2  -18.9     101 -200                imp:n=1 $ HEU hollow sphere 
c    Side dectector definitions 
c 
1      10 -1.032 -1   2 -4   3 -5  6      imp:n=1  $left side scintillator 
2      20 -7.92  -7   1 -4   3 -5  6      imp:n=1  $SS structure between scintillators 
3      10 -1.032  7  -8 -4   3 -5  6      imp:n=1  $right side scintillator 
4      30 -0.92  18  -2 30 -31 -5  9      imp:n=1  $polyethylene left of scintillator 
5      30 -0.92   8 -19 30 -31 -5  9      imp:n=1  $polyethylene right of scintillator 
6      30 -0.92   2  -8 30 -14  9 -5      imp:n=1  $polyethylene front of scintillators 
7      1  -0.0029   2  -8 -3  14  9  -5            imp:n=1  $air in front of scintillators 
8      30 -0.92   2  -8  4 -16  6 -5      imp:n=1  $polyethylene behind scintators 
9      30 -0.92   2  -8 17 -31  9 -5      imp:n=1  $polyethylene behind He-3 tubes 
10     30 -0.92   2  -8 16 -17 20 -5 +25 +24 +23 +26 +27 +28 imp:n=1 $PE around He-3 
tubes 
12     20 -7.92  11  -2 15 -13 100 -29    imp:n=1  $leg left 
13     20 -7.92 -12   8 15 -13 100 -29    imp:n=1  $right leg 
26     1  -0.0029  2 -8  15  -13  100 -29          imp:n=1  $air gap 
14     20 -7.92    (-24 34 -5  20):(-34 43 -5):(-34 20 -42) imp:n=1  $he3 tube   
15     20 -7.92    (-23 33 -5  20):(-33 43 -5):(-33 20 -42) imp:n=1  $he3 tube   
16     20 -7.92    (-26 36 -5  20):(-36 43 -5):(-36 20 -42) imp:n=1  $he3 tube   
17     20 -7.92    (-27 37 -5  20):(-37 43 -5):(-37 20 -42) imp:n=1  $he3 tube   
18     20 -7.92    (-28 38 -5  20):(-38 43 -5):(-38 20 -42) imp:n=1  $he3 tube   
19     20 -7.92    (-25 35 -5  20):(-35 43 -5):(-35 20 -42) imp:n=1  $he3 tube  
34     40 .00005377 -34 -43 42            imp:n=1  $he3 tube inside  
35     40 .00005377 -33 -43 42            imp:n=1  $he3 tube inside 
36     40 .00005377 -36 -43 42            imp:n=1  $he3 tube inside 
37     40 .00005377 -37 -43 42            imp:n=1  $he3 tube inside 
38     40 .00005377 -38 -43 42            imp:n=1  $he3 tube inside 
39     40 .00005377 -35 -43 42            imp:n=1  $he3 tube inside 
20     20 -7.92   18 -19 30 -31 -21   5   imp:n=1  $top of box structure  
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21     20 -7.92   18 -19 30 -31  -9  29   imp:n=1  $bottom of box structure 
22     20 -7.92   18 -19 15 -30  29 -21   imp:n=1  $front of box structure 
23     20 -7.92   18 -19 31 -13  29 -21   imp:n=1  $rear of box structure 
24     20 -7.92   11 -18 15 -13  29 -21   imp:n=1  $left of box structure 
25     20 -7.92   19 -12 15 -13  29 -21   imp:n=1  $right of box structure 
27      1 -0.0029 2   -8 16 -17   9 -20   imp:n=1  $air gap under He-3 tubes 
28      1 -0.0029 2   -8  3 -16   9  -6   imp:n=1  $air gap under scintillator, and poly  
c Car and Dirt Cells 
40  50 -7.82 -57 58 54 -55 50 -51         imp:n=1  $solid steel engine block 
41  1  -0.0029  59 -60 -63 64 61 -62      imp:n=1  $air inside passenger compart. 
42  50 -7.82 51 -52 54 -55 -57 58 #41     imp:n=1  $passenger compartent 
43  1  -0.0029 69 -56 59 -60 -63 64       imp:n=1  $air infront of windows 
44  80 -2.52 51 -52 55 -68 -57 58 #43     imp:n=1  $glass car windows 
45  60 -0.7  -67 61 65 -66 -63 64         imp:n=1  $gasoline located in trunk 
46  1  -0.0029 65 -66 -62 67 -63 64 #29 #30          imp:n=1  $air in trunk 
47  50 -7.82 52 -53 54 -55 58 -57 #29 #30 #45 #46    imp:n=1  $trunk 
48  70 -2.25 -100 -999                    imp:n=1  $ Earth under Car and detector 
31  1  -0.0029  -999   #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 #9 #10  
          #12 #13 #14 #15 #16 #17 #18 #19 #20 #21 #22 #23  
          #24 #25 #26 #27 #28 #34 #35 #36 #37 #38 #39 #29  
          #30 #40 #41 #42 #43 #44 #45 #46 #47 #48    imp:n=1 $ Air inside void 
99  0   999                               imp:n=0 $ Void 
 
c Surface Cards 
c 
 101   S   90 -76 49 2     $ Air void in middle 
 200   S   90 -76 49 2.42  $ Uranium Sphere 
 999   SO  500 
c Detector Surface Cards 
c  
1        px    -5 
2        px    -44 
3        py    105.065 
4        py    109.065 
5        pz    232.55 
6        pz    141.8 
7        px    5 
8        px    44 
9        pz     73.6 
11       px    -63.0 
12       px    63.0 
13       py    127.86 
14       py    100.335 
15       py    97.160 
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16       py    111.605 
17       py    124.685 
18       px    -62.365 
19       px    62.325 
20       pz    142.55 
21       pz    238.55 
23       c/z   -11.5 118.145 3.5 
24       c/z   -24.5 118.145 3.5 
25       c/z   -37.5 118.145 3.5 
26       c/z   11.5 118.145 3.5 
27       c/z   24.5 118.145 3.5 
28       c/z   37.5 118.145 3.5 
29       pz    71.15 
30       py    97.795 
31       py    127.225 
33       c/z   -11.5 118.145 3.3 
34       c/z   -24.5 118.145 3.3 
35       c/z   -37.5 118.145 3.3 
36       c/z   11.5 118.145 3.3 
37       c/z   24.5 118.145 3.3 
38       c/z   37.5 118.145 3.3 
42       pz    143.05 
43       pz    232.05 
100      pz     0 
c Car Surface Cards 
50  px  -135 
51  px  -45 
52  px  45 
53  px  135 
54  pz  15 
55  pz  83 
56  pz  151 
57  py  0 
58  py  -152 
59  px  -41 
60  px  41 
61  pz  19 
62  pz  79 
63  py  -4 
64  py  -148 
65  px  49      $Trunk 
66  px  131     $Trunk 
67  pz  40      $Gasoline Fill Level 
68  pz  153     $top of car 
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69  pz  86 
 
c Source Card 
c 
 MODE N 
c  
 nps 10000000 
c 
c Tallies 
 F2:N 200 
c 
c He3 Tallies 
 F4:N 34 
 FM4 -1 40 103 
 F14:N 35 
 FM14 -1 40 103 
 F24:N 36 
 FM24 -1 40 103 
 F34:N 37 
 FM34 -1 40 103 
 F44:N 38 
 FM44 -1 40 103 
 F54:N 39 
 FM54 -1 40 103 
c HEU 
 SDEF POS=90 -76 49 ERG=d1 RAD=d2 CEL=30 
 sp1 -3 0.799 4.903 
 si2 2 2.42  
c Material Cards 
c Air 
  m1  7014  0.7 
      8016  0.28 
      6000  0.02 
c Uranium 70% enrichment        
  m2  092235 0.7 
      092238 0.3 
c  Material 10: Plastic Scintillator 
m10    1001  0.524 
       6000  0.476 
c 
c  Material 20:  Stainless Steel (SS304) 
m20   28000 -0.092078 
      26000 -0.686083 
      24000 -0.190162 
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      25055 -0.020017 
      16000 -0.000300 
      15031 -0.000450 
      14000 -0.010009 
       7014 -0.000100 
       6000 -0.000801 
c 
c   Material 30: Polyethylene 
m30    6000 -0.85628 
       1001 -0.14372 
c 
c   Material 40: Helium-3 
m40    2003  .98 
       6000  .002 
       1001  .008 
       7014  .01 
c  Material 50: Carbon Steel 
m50    6000  .00196 
      26000  .08390 
c  7.82 g/cc 
c  Material 60: Gasoline 
 m60   006012   -1.0 
c      004012   .039711191 
c      005012   .326714801  
c      007012   .081227437 
c      008012   .0433213 
c      009012   .068592058 
c 0.7g/cc 
c   Material 70: Earth 
m70    1001  .006094 
       8016  .043421 
      14000  .017390 
      13027  .001786 
      11023  .000900 
      20000  .001958 
      26000  .000334 
c -2.25    
c Material 80: Glass - Simple Silicon Version 
m80   14000  -.0903  
      11023  -.2527 
       8016  -.601 
      20000  -.056 
c 2.52 g/cc 
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A.2. BF3 Cloud Chamber MCNPX Deck 
essage: outp=cut1p99.o runtpe=run1n.r mctal=heus.m ptrac=cut1p99 
 
c Vaccuum environment with B10 to start to learn Ptrac 
c 
c ========== Cell Cards ========== 
11 1 -.00276 -1 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ BF3 filled chamber 
12 2 -5.33 -3  imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ Ge Top 
13 2 -5.33 -2   imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ Ge Bott 
14 2 -5.33 1 2 3 -4 5 -6 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $  Ge Side wall 
98 3 -0.0029 #11 #14 2 3 -7 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ Air surrounding Ge 
99 0 7 imp:n=0 imp:p=0 $ imp:a=0 imp:#=0 $ void 
c 
c 
 
c ========== Surface Cards ======= 
c 
1 RCC 0 0 0 0 0 100 100   $ BF3 filled chamber 
2 RCC 0 0 0 0 0 -5 105 $ Bottom Ge plate 
3 RCC 0 0 100 0 0 5 105 $ Top Ge Plate 
4 CZ 105 
5 PZ 0 
6 PZ 100 
7 SO 300 
 
c ========== Source Cards ======== 
MODE N p 
nps 1000  
sdef pos= 0 0 200 vec= 0 0 1 dir=-1 erg=2   
c sp1 -3 0.799 4.903 
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c phys:p 100 0 0 0 0 -102 
c phys:n 100 0 0 -1 -1 1 3  
c PTRAC WRITE=all TYPE=a,p,# EVENT=SRC,BNK,COL,TER CELL=50 
FILE=ASC MAX=1E9 
c cut:# 1E9 0.001 
c cut:n 1E9 1.99  
c ========== Tally Cards ========= 
c 
c ========= Material Cards ======== 
c m1 = Boron Carbide with Silicon on the edges 
c m1    5010  -.173  
m1     009000 0.75 
       005010 0.225 
    005011 0.025 
c m2 = Germanium (abundance in atom percent) 
m2  032000.04p -1.0 
c m2    032070 0.2123 
c      032072 0.2766 
c      032073 0.0773 
c      032074 0.3594 
c      032076 0.744 
c m3 Air 
m3    7014  -0.7 
      8016  -0.28 
      6000  -0.02 
c m4 Uranium 70% enrichment 
m4   092235  -0.70 
092238  -0.30 
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A.3. 
10
B-
14
Si Efficiency MCNPX Deck 
Message: outp=18p.o runtpe=run10.r mctal=hd.m 
  
Borated Semiconducter Efficiency tests 
c 
c Cell Cards 
c 
1  1  -2.33 -1 2 6 -5 8 -7    imp:n=1 $ Top level of Sn 1mm Thick 
2  2  -2.33 -2 3 6 -5 8 -7    imp:n=1 $ Borated Sn, 5mm Thick 
3  1  -2.33 -3 4 6 -5 8 -7    imp:n=1 $ Lower level of Sn, 1mm Thick 
4  0  -9 #1 #2 #3          imp:n=1 $ Vacumm inside 
5  0  9                       imp:n=0 $ Void Region 
  
c Surface Cards 
c 
1  pz  0.7 
2  pz  0.6 
3  pz  0.1 
4  pz  0.0 
5  px  35 
6  px  -35 
7  py  35 
8  py  -35 
9  SO  50 
c 
 
c Source Card & Data cards 
MODE N 
c 
nps 10000000 
c  
SDEF POS=0 0 2 ERG=3.0E-8 
c 
c Tally Cards 
c 
F4:N 2 
FM4 -1 2 107 
c 
c Material Cards 
c 
c Silicon, rho = 2.33 g/cc 
  m1 014028  -1.0 
c 
c Borated Sn, B density: 2.34 
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  m2 005010  -0.18 
     014028  -0.82 
c 
 
A.4. B4C MCNPX Thickness Simulations 
Message: outp=3cm.o runtpe=run1n.r mctal=heus.m 
 
500g HEU Sphere @ 70% enrichment 
c New cylindrical shell B4C design. 15 cm thick, 100 cm radius 
c Cell Card 
c 
 29  1  -0.0029  -101                     imp:n=1 $ Air inside hollow sphere 
 30  2  -18.9     101 -200                imp:n=1 $ HEU hollow sphere 
 50  3  -11.34    200 -201 #30 #29        imp:n=1 $ Lead shell surrounding sphere 
 52  4  -1.44     201 -203  #30 #50 #29   imp:n=1 $ Borated-Poly coating 
c    New dectector definitions 
c 
 1  40  -2.31  1 3 -4 -7 100 -503  VOL=1  imp:n=1 $ B4C half cylinder right side 
 2  40  -2.31   3 -4 -7 100  503 -502  VOL=1  imp:n=1 $  
 3  40  -2.31   3 -4 -7 100  504  502 VOL=1  imp:n=1 $ 
 4  40  -2.31  1 3 -4 -7 100 -504   VOL=1  imp:n=1 $ 
 5  40  -2.31  -7 100 -2 5 -6 500  VOL=1 imp:n=1 $ BrC half cylinder left side P-1 
 6  40  -2.31  -7 100  5 -6 -500 502  VOL=1 imp:n=1 $ Left Peice 2 
 7  40  -2.31  -7 100   5 -6 -501 -502 VOL=1 imp:n=1 $  Left Peice 3 
 8  40  -2.31  -7 100 -2 5 -6 501  VOL=1 imp:n=1 $ Left Peice 4 
 9  30   -0.92  4 -8 100 -7 1 VOL=1 imp:n=1 $ Right Poly Peice 
10 30  -0.92  6 -9  100 -7 -2 VOL=1 imp:n=1 $ Left Poly Peice 
c 
c Car and Dirt Cells 
40  50 -7.82 -57 58 54 -55 50 -51         imp:n=1  $solid steel engine block 
41  1  -0.0029  59 -60 -63 64 61 -62      imp:n=1  $air inside passenger compart. 
42  50 -7.82 51 -52 54 -55 -57 58 #41     imp:n=1  $passenger compartent 
43  1  -0.0029 69 -56 59 -60 -63 64       imp:n=1  $air infront of windows 
44  80 -2.52 51 -52 55 -68 -57 58 #43     imp:n=1  $glass car windows 
45  60 -0.7  -67 61 65 -66 -63 64         imp:n=1  $gasoline located in trunk 
46  1  -0.0029 65 -66 -62 67 -63 64 #29 #30 #50 #52 imp:n=1  $air in trunk 
47  50 -7.82 52 -53 54 -55 58 -57 #29 #30 #45 #46 #50 #52  imp:n=1  $trunk 
48  70 -2.25 -100 -999                    imp:n=1  $ Earth under Car and detector 
31  1  -0.0029  -999  #29 #30 #40 #41 #42 #43 #44 #45  
                  #9 #10 #46 #47 #48 #50 #52 #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8  imp:n=1 $ Air inside 
void 
99  0   999                               imp:n=0 $ Void 
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c Surface Cards 
c 
 101   S   90 -76 49 2     $ Air void in middle 
 200   S   90 -76 49 2.42  $ Uranium Sphere 
 201   S   90 -76 49 3     $ Lead Casing 
 203   S   90 -76 49 7     $ Polyethylene 
 999   SO  10000 
c Detector Surface Cards 
c  
1  py  25 
2  py  -177 
3  c/z   50 25  100 
4  c/z   50 25  103 
5  c/z   50 -177  100 
6  c/z   50 -177  103 
7  pz  170  $ top of car 
8  c/z   50 25  113.16 
9  c/z   50 -177 113.16 
500   P  1 1 0 -127         
501   P  -1 1 0 -227 
502   PX   50   
503   P  1 1 0  75 
504   P  -1 1 0 -25   
c 
c Car Surface Cards 
100 pz 0 
50  px  -135 
51  px  -45 
52  px  45 
53  px  135 
54  pz  15 
55  pz  83 
56  pz  151 
57  py  0 
58  py  -152 
59  px  -41 
60  px  41 
61  pz  19 
62  pz  79 
63  py  -4 
64  py  -148 
65  px  49      $Trunk 
66  px  131     $Trunk 
67  pz  40      $Gasoline Fill Level 
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68  pz  153     $top of car 
69  pz  86 
 
c Source Card 
c 
 MODE N 
c  
 nps 10000000 
c 
c Tallies 
c 
 F4:N 1 
 FM4 -1 40 107 
 F14:N 2 
 FM14 -1 40 107 
 F34:N 3 
 FM34 -1 40 107 
 F44:N 4 
 FM44 -1 40 107 
 F54:N 5 
 FM54 -1 40 107 
 F64:N 6 
 FM64 -1 40 107  
 F74:N 7 
 FM74 -1 40 107 
 F84:N 8 
 FM84 -1 40 107  
 F204:N (1 2 3 4) 
 FM204 -1 40 107   
 F214:N (5 6 7 8) 
 FM214 -1 40 107   
c HEU 
 SDEF POS=90 -76 49 ERG=d1 RAD=d2 CEL=30 
 sp1 -3 0.799 4.903 
 si2 2 2.42  
c Material Cards 
c Air 
  m1  7014  -0.7 
      8016  -0.28 
      6000  -0.02 
c Uranium 70% enrichment        
  m2  092235 -0.7 
      092238 -0.3 
c Lead 
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  m3  082000 -1.0 
c -11.34 g/cc   
c Thermo-Reax Boroated poly 
  m4  005010 -0.05 
      006000 -0.82128 
      001001 -0.12232  
c -1.4 g/cc   
c  Material 10: Plastic Scintillator 
m10    1001  -0.524 
       6000  -0.476 
c 
c  Material 20:  Stainless Steel (SS304) 
m20   28000 -0.092078 
      26000 -0.686083 
      24000 -0.190162 
      25055 -0.020017 
      16000 -0.000300 
      15031 -0.000450 
      14000 -0.010009 
       7014 -0.000100 
       6000 -0.000801 
c 
c   Material 30: Polyethylene 
m30    6000 -0.85628 
       1001 -0.14372 
c 
c   Material 40: Boron-Carbide w/ silicon on edges , 2.31g/cc 
m40    5010  -.173 
       5011  -.02 
       6012  -.057 
      14028  -.75  
c  Material 50: Carbon Steel 
m50    28000 -0.092078 
      26000 -0.684983 
      24000 -0.190162 
      25055 -0.020017 
      16000 -0.000300 
      15031 -0.000450 
      14000 -0.010009 
       7014 -0.000100 
       6000 -0.001901 
c  7.82 g/cc 
c  Material 60: Gasoline 
 m60   006012   -1.0 
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c      004012   .039711191 
c      005012   .326714801  
c      007012   .081227437 
c      008012   .0433213 
c      009012   .068592058 
c 0.7g/cc 
c   Material 70: Earth 
m70    1001  .006094 
       8016  .043421 
      14000  .017390 
      13027  .001786 
      11023  .000900 
      20000  .001958 
      26000  .000334 
c -2.25    
c Material 80: Glass - Simple Silicon Version 
m80   14000  -.0903  
      11023  -.2527 
       8016  -.601 
      20000  -.056 
c 2.52 g/cc 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A.5. B4C MCNPX Half Cylindrical Shell Detector Deck 
Message: outp=n50.o runtpe=run1f.r mctal=heus.m 
 
500g HEU Sphere @ 70% enrichment 
c New cylindrical shell B4C design. 25 cm thick, 100 cm radius 
c Cell Card 
c 
 29  1  -0.0029  -101                     imp:n=1 $ Air inside hollow sphere 
 30  2  -18.9     101 -200                imp:n=1 $ HEU hollow sphere 
 50  3  -11.34    200 -201 #30 #29        imp:n=1 $ Lead shell surrounding sphere 
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 52  4  -1.44     201 -203  #30 #50 #29   imp:n=1 $ Borated-Poly coating 
c    New dectector definitions 
c 
 1  40  -2.31  1 3 -4 -7 100   VOL=1  imp:n=1 $ B4C half cylinder right side 
 2  40  -2.31  -7 100 -2 5 -6   VOL=1 imp:n=1 $ BrC half cylinder left side  
c 
c Car and Dirt Cells 
40  50 -7.82 -57 58 54 -55 50 -51         imp:n=1  $solid steel engine block 
41  1  -0.0029  59 -60 -63 64 61 -62      imp:n=1  $air inside passenger compart. 
42  50 -7.82 51 -52 54 -55 -57 58 #41     imp:n=1  $passenger compartent 
43  1  -0.0029 69 -56 59 -60 -63 64       imp:n=1  $air infront of windows 
44  80 -2.52 51 -52 55 -68 -57 58 #43     imp:n=1  $glass car windows 
45  60 -0.7  -67 61 65 -66 -63 64         imp:n=1  $gasoline located in trunk 
46  1  -0.0029 65 -66 -62 67 -63 64 #29 #30 #50 #52 imp:n=1  $air in trunk 
47  50 -7.82 52 -53 54 -55 58 -57 #29 #30 #45 #46 #50 #52  imp:n=1  $trunk 
48  70 -2.25 -100 -999                    imp:n=1  $ Earth under Car and detector 
31  1  -0.0029  -999  #29 #30 #40 #41 #42 #43 #44 #45  
                     #46 #47 #48 #50 #52 #1 #2  imp:n=1 $ Air inside void 
99  0   999                               imp:n=0 $ Void 
 
c Surface Cards 
c 
 101   S   90 -76 49 2     $ Air void in middle 
 200   S   90 -76 49 2.42  $ Uranium Sphere 
 201   S   90 -76 49 3     $ Lead Casing 
 203   S   90 -76 49 7     $ Polyethylene 
 999   SO  1000 
c Detector Surface Cards 
c  
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1  py  25 
2  py  -177 
3  c/z   -50 25  100 
4  c/z   -50 25  115 
5  c/z   -50 -177  100 
6  c/z   -50 -177  115 
7  pz  170  $ top of car 
c 
c Car Surface Cards 
100 pz 0 
50  px  -135 
51  px  -45 
52  px  45 
53  px  135 
54  pz  15 
55  pz  83 
56  pz  151 
57  py  0 
58  py  -152 
59  px  -41 
60  px  41 
61  pz  19 
62  pz  79 
63  py  -4 
64  py  -148 
65  px  49      $Trunk 
66  px  131     $Trunk 
67  pz  40      $Gasoline Fill Level 
68  pz  153     $top of car 
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69  pz  86 
 
c Source Card 
c 
 MODE N 
c  
 nps 10000000 
c 
c Tallies 
c 
 F4:N 1 
 FM4 -1 40 107 
 F14:N 2 
 FM14 -1 40 107 
c HEU 
 SDEF POS=90 -76 49 ERG=d1 RAD=d2 CEL=30 
 sp1 -3 0.799 4.903 
 si2 2 2.42  
c Material Cards 
c Air 
  m1  7014  0.7 
      8016  0.28 
      6000  0.02 
c Uranium 70% enrichment        
  m2  092235 0.7 
      092238 0.3 
c Lead 
  m3  082000 1.0 
c -11.34 g/cc   
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c Thermo-Reax Boroated poly 
  m4  005010 0.05 
      006000 0.82128 
      001001 0.12232  
c -1.4 g/cc   
c  Material 10: Plastic Scintillator 
m10    1001  0.524 
       6000  0.476 
c 
c  Material 20:  Stainless Steel (SS304) 
m20   28000 -0.092078 
      26000 -0.686083 
      24000 -0.190162 
      25055 -0.020017 
      16000 -0.000300 
      15031 -0.000450 
      14000 -0.010009 
       7014 -0.000100 
       6000 -0.000801 
c 
c   Material 30: Polyethylene 
m30    6000 -0.85628 
       1001 -0.14372 
c 
c   Material 40: Boron-Carbide w/ silicon on edges , 2.31g/cc 
m40    5010  .173 
            5011  .02 
            6012  .057 
          14028  .75  
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c  Material 50: Carbon Steel 
m50    28000 -0.092078 
      26000 -0.684983 
      24000 -0.190162 
      25055 -0.020017 
      16000 -0.000300 
      15031 -0.000450 
      14000 -0.010009 
       7014 -0.000100 
       6000 -0.001901 
c  7.82 g/cc 
c  Material 60: Gasoline 
 m60   006012   -1.0 
c      004012   .039711191 
c      005012   .326714801  
c      007012   .081227437 
c      008012   .0433213 
c      009012   .068592058 
c 0.7g/cc 
c   Material 70: Earth 
m70    1001  .006094 
       8016  .043421 
      14000  .017390 
      13027  .001786 
      11023  .000900 
      20000  .001958 
      26000  .000334 
c -2.25    
c Material 80: Glass - Simple Silicon Version 
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m80   14000  -.0903  
      11023  -.2527 
       8016  -.601 
      20000  -.056 
c 2.52 g/cc 
 
A.6. Doppler Broadening Algorithm Created in the C Programming Language 
 
/* Trial doppler broadening program in c*/ 
#include <stdio.h> 
#include <ctype.h> 
#include <string.h> 
#include <stdlib.h> 
#include <math.h> 
#include <time.h> 
 
 double doppinfo[6]; 
 double li_info[6]; 
 double a_uvw[3]; 
 double na_solve[3]; 
 double n_info[6]; 
 double PtoXZ[3][3]; 
 double XZtoZ[3][3]; 
 double ZtoXZ[3][3]; 
 double XZtoP[3][3]; 
 double alpharx[3][3]; 
 double neurx[3][3]; 
 double gamrx[3][3]; 
 double gamrz[3][3]; 
 double malph=4.002602, mli=6.941, mn=1.0086649156; 
 
 
 double tempstor[4000000],particle_num=0,dopp_count=0; 
 char data[4000000],test[100], *EOnumber;  
  
int main(void) 
{ 
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 FILE *rp,*wp,*wp1; 
 rp = fopen("thermdatc1","r+"); 
 wp = fopen("thermoutput6.txt","w"); 
 wp1 = fopen("alphadata.txt","w"); 
 fseek (rp, 3, SEEK_END); 
 fputc ('z',rp); 
 fseek (rp, 0, SEEK_SET); 
 
 fprintf(wp,"Doppler Broadening Algorithm Output Data File \n\n"); 
  
 
 printf("\nCrap Data:\n"); 
  
 //*********** Attempting to fill crap file with a certain amount of lines ***** 
 int flag1=0,iter=0; 
 char front[1000]; 
 while(flag1<10){ 
  front[iter]=fgetc(rp); 
  //fread(crap,iter,1,fp); 
   //if(*fp=='\n') 
   if(front[iter]=='\n') 
   flag1++; 
    iter++; 
  
 }  
  /* -Eliminating first lines of the code is complete (based off of a set number of 
lines. 
  -Data will be read into program, converted to double format, then 
segmented in an array based off of 
  individual particle information. (Every particle will be a temporary array, 
none of the information  
  will be stored permanently). 
  -Search will be performed on the individual particle # to determine if 
477.6 kev interaction is in the  
  array. If the energy level occurs, math will then be performed based off of 
defined array spacing to  
  determine doppler broadening. 
  - An output file will be generated which tells: 
   - # of Doppler broadening cases 
   - list broadened energies with particle #  
   - percentage of broadened particle interactions*/ 
 
  
 double dopp_time = 0.0, dota_li=0.0, dota_n=0.0; 
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 double ecut = 0.01; 
 double dotli_nsolved=0, dotli_ngiven=0; 
 int p1,cut,p2=0,terminate=0; 
 int alphaflag=0,cut2=0; 
 double phi=0,theta=0, Ealpha=0,gamm_ang1=0,gamm_ang2=0;  
 int ertal=0, z=0; 
  
 while(terminate == 0){ 
  
 fread (data, 4000000,1, rp);  
  
 for (int i=0; i<4000000; i++){  
 tempstor[i]=0; 
 if(data[i] == 'z'){ 
 printf("The program has finished reading input"); 
 terminate = 1; 
 break;} 
  
 } 
  
 for(int i=0; i<4000000; i++){ 
  cut=0; 
  double freq_gam=0, freq_rel=0, rel_gam=0, beta=0, dopp_fin=0, 
cos_angle=0; 
   
 
  if(i==0){ 
   tempstor[i]=strtod(data,&EOnumber); 
   particle_num=tempstor[0]; 
   } 
  else{ 
   tempstor[i]=strtod(EOnumber,&EOnumber); 
  } 
 
  if(tempstor[i-2]==0.477600){ 
   p2=i-8; 
 
    for(int k=0; k<7; k++){  
     doppinfo[k]=tempstor[p2];  // Assign variable 
information to Dopp_info array (energy, position, dir.) 
     p2++; 
     } 
   dopp_count++; 
 96 
 
 
 
 
   dopp_time = tempstor[i];    // Locates time (in 
shakes) 477.6 KeV particle is created 
 
    for(int g=(i-1); g>0; g--){     //Going backwards through 
input file to find pertinant data 
     if((tempstor[g] == dopp_time) &&   // Test 1. 
Looks for same time 
        (tempstor[g-12] == 35.00000) && // Test 2. 
Looks to see if its a Heavy Ion 
        (tempstor[g-2] > ecut)){         // Test 3. Looks to 
see if its above energy cutoff 
      g=g-2; 
      p1=6; 
      cut=1; 
     } 
     if((tempstor[g] == dopp_time) &&   // Test 1. 
Looks for same time 
        (tempstor[g-12] == 1.00000) && 
        (tempstor[g-17] != dopp_time)){    // Test 2. 
Looks to see if its a Neutron 
                        g=g-19; 
      p1=6; 
      cut=2; 
      /*if((tempstor[g-17] == 
0.00000)||(tempstor[g-34] == 0.00000)){ 
      unscat_tal++; 
      cut2=1; 
      g=g-2; 
      p1=6; 
      cut=2; 
      } 
      else if(cut2==0){ 
      z=0; 
      scat_tal++; 
      z=g-19; 
      p1=6; 
      cut=2; 
      } 
      else 
      ertal++;*/ 
     } 
     if((tempstor[g] == dopp_time) &&   // Test 1. 
Looks for same time 
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        (tempstor[g-12] == 34.00000)){    // Test 2. 
Looks to see if its a Neutron 
      alphaflag=1; 
     }    
     if( cut == 1){             // Assign variable information 
to Li_info array (energy, position, dir.) 
       
      li_info[p1] = tempstor[g]; 
      p1--; 
     } 
     if( cut == 2){            // Assign variable information 
to neutron array (energy, position, dir.) 
      n_info[p1] = tempstor[g]; 
      p1--; 
     } 
     if(p1 == 0){ 
     cut=0; 
     cut2=0; 
     z=0;} 
    } 
  
 //========================================================
========================================= 
   //Beginnign of mathematics involving involving alpha, gamma, 
neutron angle creation and rotations 
   Ealpha = n_info[6]-li_info[6]+2.31; 
   // Phi = angle between Lithium particle & incident neutron  
   phi = acos((-
2*malph*Ealpha+2*mli*li_info[6]+2*mn*n_info[6])/(2*sqrt(2*mli*li_info[6])*sqrt(2*
mn*n_info[6]))); 
   // Theta = angle between Alpha particle & incident neutron 
   theta = 
acos(sqrt(2*mn*n_info[6])/sqrt(2*malph*Ealpha)+(2*malph*Ealpha-2*mli*li_info[6]-
2*mn*n_info[6])/(2*sqrt(2*malph*Ealpha)*sqrt(2*mn*n_info[6]))); 
  
 //========================================================
========================================== 
   //* 
   //* 
   //* 
   //* 
  
 //========================================================
========================================== 
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   //Solving Alpha(u,v,w) Using Neutron and Lithium information, 
Then solving neutron u,v,w using calculated alpha and Lithium UVW's 
   // Done by C.O.E. and C.O.M. 
   a_uvw[1] = (n_info[3]*sqrt(2*mn*n_info[6])-
li_info[3]*sqrt(2*mli*li_info[6]))/(sqrt(2*malph*Ealpha)); 
   a_uvw[2] = (n_info[4]*sqrt(2*mn*n_info[6])-
li_info[4]*sqrt(2*mli*li_info[6]))/(sqrt(2*malph*Ealpha)); 
   a_uvw[3] = (n_info[5]*sqrt(2*mn*n_info[6])-
li_info[5]*sqrt(2*mli*li_info[6]))/(sqrt(2*malph*Ealpha)); 
   dota_li = 
acos(a_uvw[1]*li_info[3]+a_uvw[2]*li_info[4]+a_uvw[3]*li_info[5])*180/3.14159265; 
   na_solve[1] = 
(a_uvw[1]*sqrt(2*malph*Ealpha)+li_info[3]*sqrt(2*mli*li_info[6]))/sqrt(2*mn*n_info[
6]); 
   na_solve[2] = 
(a_uvw[2]*sqrt(2*malph*Ealpha)+li_info[4]*sqrt(2*mli*li_info[6]))/sqrt(2*mn*n_info[
6]); 
   na_solve[3] = 
(a_uvw[3]*sqrt(2*malph*Ealpha)+li_info[5]*sqrt(2*mli*li_info[6]))/sqrt(2*mn*n_info[
6]); 
   dotli_nsolved = 
acos(li_info[3]*na_solve[1]+li_info[4]*na_solve[2]+na_solve[3]*li_info[5])*180/3.141
59265; 
   dotli_ngiven = 
acos(li_info[3]*n_info[3]+li_info[4]*n_info[4]+li_info[5]*n_info[5])*180/3.14159265; 
  
 //========================================================
========================================== 
   //* 
   //* 
   //* 
   //* 
  
 //========================================================
========================================== 
   /*Creating Rotational Matrices for Alpha, Neutron, Gamma 
Particles  
   //1. Initialize all matricies to Zero 
   for (int a=0; a<3; a++){ 
    for (int b=0; b<3; b++){ 
    PtoXZ[a][b]=0; 
    XZtoP[a][b]=0; 
    XZtoZ[a][b]=0; 
    ZtoXZ[a][b]=0; 
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    alpharx[a][b]=0; 
    neurx[3][3]=0; 
    gamrx[a][b]=0; 
    gamrz[a][b]=0; 
    } 
   } 
     
   //2.Rotate to XZ Plane 
   PtoXZ[0][0] = PtoXZ[1][1] = 
li_info[3]/sqrt(pow(li_info[3],2)+pow(li_info[4],2)); 
   PtoXZ[2][2] = 1; 
   PtoXZ[0][1] = 
li_info[4]/sqrt(pow(li_info[3],2)+pow(li_info[4],2)); 
   PtoXZ[1][0] = -
li_info[4]/sqrt(pow(li_info[3],2)+pow(li_info[4],2)); 
   //3. Rotate to Z Axis 
   XZtoZ[0][0] = XZtoZ[2][2] = 
li_info[5]/sqrt(pow(li_info[3],2)+pow(li_info[4],2)+pow(li_info[5],2)); 
   XZtoZ[1][1] = 1; 
   XZtoZ[0][2] = 
sqrt(pow(li_info[3],2)+pow(li_info[4],2))/sqrt(pow(li_info[3],2)+pow(li_info[4],2)+pow
(li_info[5],2)); 
   XZtoZ[2][0] = -XZtoZ[0][2]; 
   //4.A. Rotate about X Axis-- Alpha particle 
   alpharx[0][0] = 1; 
   alpharx[1][1] = alpharx[2][2] = cos(theta+phi); 
   alpharx[1][2] = -sin(theta+phi); 
   alpharx[2][1] = sin(theta+phi); 
   //4.B. Rotate about X Axis-- Neutron 
   neurx[0][0] = 1; 
   neurx[1][1] = neurx[2][2] = cos(phi); 
   neurx[1][2] = -sin(phi); 
   neurx[2][1] = sin(phi); 
   //4.C. Rotate about X Axis-- De-xcitation Photon (random # = 
0<#<pi) 
   srand (time(NULL)); 
   gamm_ang1 = 
(double)(rand()%100000000)/100000000*3.14159265; 
   srand (time(NULL)); 
   gamm_ang2 = 
(double)(rand()%100000000)/100000000*6.28318531; 
   //5. Rotate Z to XZ 
   for (int a=0; a<3; a++){ 
    for (int b=0; b<3; b++){ 
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    ZtoXZ[a][b]=XZtoZ[a][b];} 
   } 
   ZtoXZ[0][2] = -ZtoXZ[0][2]; 
   ZtoXZ[2][0] = -ZtoXZ[2][0]; 
   //6.Rotate XZ back to original frame 
   for (int a=0; a<3; a++){ 
    for (int b=0; b<3; b++){ 
    XZtoP[a][b]=PtoXZ[a][b];} 
   } 
   XZtoP[0][1]=-XZtoP[0][1]; 
   XZtoP[1][0]=-XZtoP[1][0]; 
    
   */ 
  
 //========================================================
========================================== 
   //* 
   //* 
   //* 
   //* 
  
 //========================================================
========================================== 
   // Beginning doppler broadening mathematics 
   freq_gam = doppinfo[6]*pow(10,6)/4.13566733E-15; 
   beta = (sqrt(2*li_info[6]*pow(10,6)*1.60217653E-
19/(6.94*1.660538782E-27)))/3E8; 
   cos_angle = li_info[3]*doppinfo[3] + li_info[4]*doppinfo[4] + 
li_info[5]*doppinfo[5];   
   rel_gam = 1/sqrt(1-beta*beta); 
   freq_rel = (freq_gam/rel_gam)*1/(1-beta*cos_angle); 
   dopp_fin = (freq_rel*4.13566733E-15)*pow(10,-6); 
   /*if(alphaflag==1){ 
   fprintf(wp,"Particle number[%f]    %f\nPhi: %f\nTheta: %f Alpha 
Flag\n\n",particle_num,dopp_fin,phi,theta); 
   fprintf(wp,"[%12f]  %12f\n",particle_num,dop_fin 
   alphaflag=0; 
   } */ 
    
   fprintf(wp,"[%12f]  %12f\n",particle_num,dopp_fin); 
    
      //fprintf(wp,"Ealpha= %f\nNeutron Info: %f %f %f %f %f %f 
%f\n",Ealpha,n_info[0],n_info[1],n_info[2],n_info[3],n_info[4],n_info[5],n_info[6]); 
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      //fprintf(wp,"Lithitum Info: %f %f %f %f %f %f 
%f\n",li_info[0],li_info[1],li_info[2],li_info[3],li_info[4],li_info[5],li_info[6]); 
   //fprintf(wp,"SUMSQ Neutron: %f 
\n",pow(n_info[3],2)+pow(n_info[4],2)+pow(n_info[5],2)); 
   //fprintf(wp,"SUMSQ Lithium: %f 
\n",pow(li_info[3],2)+pow(li_info[4],2)+pow(li_info[5],2)); 
   //fprintf(wp1," %12f  %12f %12f %12f %12f 
%12f",particle_num,a_uvw[1],a_uvw[2],a_uvw[3],dota_li,pow(a_uvw[1],2)+pow(a_uv
w[2],2)+pow(a_uvw[3],2)); 
   //fprintf(wp1," %12f %12f %12f %12f %12f %12f %12f 
%12f\n",na_solve[1],na_solve[2],na_solve[3],dotli_ngiven,n_info[3],n_info[4],n_info[5]
,dotli_nsolved); 
   } 
 
 
   
  if((tempstor[i-17]==9000.00000) && // Indexs the particle number by 
searching for the flag 
     (tempstor[i-34]==5000.00000) && // and termination interaction #'s, 
and performs one last 
      (0 < tempstor[i]-particle_num <= 5)&& 
     (tempstor[i-2] < 1000 )){ // check to determine if the number is close to 
its last  
   particle_num = tempstor[i]; 
   continue; 
   } 
 
  } 
   
 
 for(int k=0; k<7; k++){ 
 printf("Neutron info [%i]: %f\n",k,n_info[k]); 
 } 
 printf("\n\n Particle # = %f\n # of Broadenings Occuring = %f\n Ratio = %f\n", 
particle_num,dopp_count,dopp_count/particle_num); 
  
 printf("\n\n"); 
 
} 
   
 
    
   printf("\n\n"); 
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 printf("\n %f %f\n",gamm_ang1,gamm_ang2); 
 return 0; 
 fclose (wp); 
 fclose (rp); 
 
 
} 
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